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HOLDING CORPORATE OFFICERS STRICTLY LIABLE 
UNDER PATENT AND COPYRIGHT LAW 
Lynda J. Oswald* 
ljoswald@umich.edu 
 
 
The law encourages economic activity by limiting the personal liability of owners 
through the corporate form. Not surprisingly, corporate decisionmakers are also concerned 
with personal liability. Perhaps nothing is more important to a corporate officer than 
understanding when he or she may be personally liable for corporate liabilities. Officers do not 
participate to the full extent in the success of the corporation; correspondingly, they have little 
interest in assuming the risks. 
Imposition of personal liability should be fair, predictable, and further (rather than 
frustrate) important societal goals. Otherwise, corporate officers may be overcautious, make 
inefficient decisions, and forego economic activity that the corporate form was intended to 
encourage. 
 Patent and copyright law share certain fundamental characteristics. Both forms of 
intellectual property play a dual role: encouraging invention and creation but also providing for 
the public interest.1 Most significantly, for purposes of this manuscript, the infringement of a 
* Professor of Business Law, Ross School of Business, University of Michigan. © 2014 Lynda J. Oswald.  
1 See Sony Corp. v. Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984) (noting that the provision for protection 
of copyright and patent in Art. 1, § 8 of the U.S. Constitution “is intended to motivate the creative activity of 
authors and inventors by the provision of a special reward, or to allow the public access to the products of their 
genius after the limited period of exclusive control has expired,” but that “reward to the owner [is] a secondary 
consideration”). The third form of federal intellectual property, trademark law, focuses more on protection of and 
provision of accurate information to the consumer and less on promotion of the interests of the trademark owner.  
See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., Inc., 514 U.S. 159, 163-64 (1995) (“trademark law, by preventing others 
from copying a source identifying mark, ‘reduce[s] the customer’s costs of shopping and making purchasing 
decisions,’” and ‘helps assure a producer that it (and not an imitating competitor) will reap the financial-related 
rewards associated with a desirable product”) (citation omitted; brackets in original). Because of this difference in 
focus,this paper does not address officer liability for trademark infringement, leaving that topic to later exploration 
in another work.  This topic is covered briefly in See Ronald B. Coolley, Personal Liability of Corporate Officers and 
Directors for Infringement of Intellectual Property, 68 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 228, 238 (1986). 
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patent or a copyright is a tort.2 The critical implication of this characterization is that general 
principles of tort and agency law apply to such infringement—a point that has important 
ramifications for infringement rules and individual liability. Thus, exploration of traditional 
doctrine is important as an initial starting point.  However, corporate officer liability doctrines 
under both the Patent Act3 and Copyright Act4 diverge markedly from traditional corporate, 
agency, and tort doctrines. Why this is so? And what are the implications of this divergence? 
 Part I of this paper explores traditional corporate, agency, and tort law concepts. These 
include the corporate law doctrine that shields the corporate owners—shareholders—from 
liability in most instances. It also examines traditional tort law rules that impose liability upon a 
corporate officer for his or her own wrongful acts, and agency rules of respondeat superior that 
would impute that individual’s actions to the corporation. Part II examines officer liability under 
the Patent Act, finding that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (“Federal Circuit”) 
has inappropriately imposed liability upon corporate officers through a distorted application of 
piercing doctrine. In effect, the Federal Circuit uses doctrine applicable only to corporate owner 
liability to reach corporate officers. Similarly, Part III examines individual officer liability for 
copyright infringement, finding that the regional circuit courts of appeal apply a vicarious 
liability test that is not only inapposite to officer liability, but in some ways mimics the piercing 
analysis used by the Federal Circuit in the patent law arena and in other ways replicates the 
personal participation test of traditional doctrine. Part IV discusses why individual officer 
liability is so muddled in both patent and copyright law, and concludes that current case law 
reflects an instinctive rejection by the courts of application of strict liability to individuals. The 
courts’ subconscious efforts to reach liability standards and outcomes that are fault-based, 
rather than strict, for corporate officers have caused the courts to create sui generis officer 
liability rules that are at odds with traditional doctrine. The goal of the courts is laudable, but 
their approach creates uncertainty and may impose liability in inappropriate situations. I 
propose a more direct approach to imposition of personal liability on corporate officers that 
focuses on culpability. 
I. CORPORATE OFFICER LIABILTY UNDER TRADITIONAL DOCTRINE 
2 See infra notes 9 (patent law) & 148 (copyright law) and accompanying text.  
3 35 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (2012). 
4 15 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (2012). 
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 When a corporation5 commits a tort or other wrongful act, that corporation, naturally, is 
liable for the harm or injury that ensues. In some instances, however, the plaintiff may seek to 
hold individual officers liable, in addition to the corporation. In any given case, we can 
speculate as to why a plaintiff seeks to extend liability to an individual officer, but the potential 
explanations are myriad and seldom articulated in the courts’ opinions: perhaps because the 
corporation has insufficient funds to fully compensate for the infringement and so additional 
pockets are sought,6 because the plaintiff is seeking access to directors and officers insurance,7 
because the individual’s behavior is viewed as particularly culpable and need of punishment, 
because the corporation is small or closely held and it is thus difficult to distinguish the various 
roles that the officer / employee / owner holds, or because the plaintiff seeks to create 
divisiveness between the corporation and its officers that will encourage settlement.8 
Whatever the reason, the case law reveals that patent and copyright owners sometimes do 
seek to hold officers personally liable,9 and that the legal standards used to assess such 
personal liability deviate substantially from traditional tort and agency doctrines of corporate 
officers liability imposed in other contexts. 
5 Like the shareholders of a corporation, see, e.g., MODEL BUS. COR. ACT § 6.22(a) (2008) (“Unless otherwise provided 
in the articles of corporation, a shareholder of a corporation is not personally liable for the acts or debts of the 
corporation except that he may become personally liable by reason of his own acts or conduct.”), members of 
limited liability companies (“LLCs”) also enjoy the limited liability afforded to shareholders of corporations. See, 
e.g., UNIF. LTD. LIAB. ACT § 303(a), 6B U.L.A. 587 (1996) (“A member or manager of [an LLC] is not personally liable 
for a debt, obligation, or liability of the company solely by reason of being or acting as a member or manager.”).  
Commentators have addressed the application of piercing analysis to these non-corporation forms of limited 
liability entities. See, e.g., Robert B. Thompson, The Limits of Liability in the New Limited Liability Entities, 32 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 1, 7 (1997) (“[We can expect a regular flow of cases seeking to pierce the veil of these new limited 
liability entities addressed to closely held businesses.”). For ease of discussion, this manuscript refers only to 
“corporations,” but the discussion should be seen as referring to other limited liability companies as well.  
6 See Coolley, supra note 1, at 228  (“Personal liability of a corporate officers or director is advantageous to a 
plaintiff since it increases the number of pockets available for payment of damages and can increase the likelihood 
of settlement.”); Dangler v. Imperial Machine Co., 11 F.2d 945, 947 (7th Cir. 1926) (“There are . . . numerous 
authorities that hold the managing officers liable for damages committed by the corporation in case of 
infringements. The enforcement of this liability is seldom sought, except in the case of insolvency of the 
corporation.”). 
7 See Lynda J .Oswald, The Personal Liability of Corporate Officers for Patent Infringement, 44 IDEA 115, 121 n.32 
(2003). 
8 See  Jason A. Wietjes & Michael D. Pegues, Director and Officer Liability for Inducement of Patent Infringement, 
21 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LITIGATION, no. 2, p. 3, 3 (Winter 2010) (published by ABA Section of Litigation, Intellectual 
Property Litigation Committee). 
9 See infra Parts II (patent) and III (copyright). 
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 The individual liability of corporate officers implicates the intersection of three areas of 
traditional legal doctrine: corporate, tort, and agency law. The question of which parties (if any) 
can be held liable for torts or other wrongdoings depends upon both the actions and the roles 
of the parties involved. A corporation is a legal entity; it is separate and distinct from both its 
owners (whether individual shareholders or a parent corporation) and its corporate officers.10 
In the normal course of events, neither the corporate officers nor the corporate owners (i.e., 
shareholders) are liable for the debts or torts of the corporation.11 However, in extraordinary 
circumstances, liability can attach to either corporate officers or shareholders; that liability, 
however, differs depending upon whether individual to whom liability is extended is an owner 
or an officer, and the standards for imposing such liability likewise differ.   
 A. Liability of Corporate Owners: Piercing of the Corporate Veil 
 Normally, shareholders, whether individuals, parent corporations, or other affiliated 
groups, are protected from the debts and liabilities of the corporation (beyond their 
contribution to capital) by the principle of limited liability.12 That limited liability can be ignored, 
however, where respecting it would “defeat public convenience, justify wrong, or protect 
fraud.”13 Imposition of liability upon corporate owners in such instances is known as “piercing 
the corporate veil.” Typically, the courts employ piercing only where: (1) the corporation was 
10 See, e.g., Walker v. Anderson, 232 S.W.3d 899, 918 (Tex. App. 2007) (“A corporation is a separate legal entity 
from its shareholders, officers, and directors.”). 
11 See FMC Finance Corp. v. Murphree, 632 F.2d 413, 421 (5th Cir. 1980) (“A corporation is a legal entity existing 
separate and distinct from its shareholders, officers and directors, who as a general rule are not liable for the 
corporation’s debts and obligations.”); Frank H.  Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischer, Limited Liability and the 
Corporation, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 89, 89-90 (1985) (“The rule of limited liability means that the investors in the 
corporation are not liable for more than the amount they invest. . . . The managers and other workers are not 
vicariously liable for the firm’s deeds.”). 
12 Krivo Indus. Supply Co. v. Nat’l Distillers & Chem. Corp., 483 F.2d 11098, 1102 (5th Cir. 1973), modified per 
curiam, 490 F.2d 916 (5th Cir. 1974): 
Basic to the theory of corporation law is the concept that a corporation is a separate entity, a 
legal being having an existence separate and distinct from that of its owners. This attribute of the 
separate corporate personality enables the corporation’s stockholders to limit their personal 
liability to the extent of their investment. . . . The corporate form, however, is not lightly 
disregarded, since limited liability is one of the principal purposes for which the law has created 
the corporation. 
 See also MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT. § 6.22(b) (2002) (“Unless otherwise provided in the articles of incorporation, a 
shareholder of a corporation is not personally liable for the acts or debts of the corporation except that he may 
become personally liable by reason of his own acts or conduct.”). 
13 Fish v. East, 114 F.2d 177, 191 (10th Cir. 1940). 
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formed or used for an illegal, fraudulent, or unjust purpose,  or (2) where the shareholders have 
ignored the corporate form and have used it to conduct their own affairs (known as the “mere 
instrumentality” or “alter ego”’ theory).14 Most courts require that piercing be supported by 
findings: “(1) that there be such unity of interest and ownership that the separate personalities 
of the corporation and the individual no longer exist and (2) that, if the acts are treated as 
those of the corporation alone, an inequitable result will follow.”15 
 Although the term “piercing the corporate veil” is over 100 years old,16 there are 
relatively few examples of it in action.17 The act of piercing the corporate veil is considered an 
extraordinary event,18 and courts engage in it only on an infrequent basis.  Glynn characterized 
the “[v]eil piercing jurisprudence [as] unpredictable, inconsistent, and largely unprincipled.”19 
In practice, veil piercing is used only to reach the owners of closely held corporations or parent 
corporations—not to reach shareholders of large, publicly-held corporations,20 even though in 
14 Oswald, supra note 7, at 120 (citing 1 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE 
CORPORATIONS FLETCHER, ET AL, §41.10 (rev. vol. West Group 1999)). In employing these tests, the courts look to 
factors such as whether the corporate formalities have been respected (i.e., has a board of directors been created, 
have corporate officers been appointed, and have corporate financial accounts and records been maintained?), see 
Mark J. Loewenstein, Veil Piercing to Non-Owners: A Practical and Theoretical Inquiry, 41 SETON HALL L. REV. 839, 
846 (2011), and whether the corporation has been adequately capitalized. Id. at 847. See also id. at 848 (noting 
that “[b]ecause ‘formalities’ are not an issue in the operation of an LLC, courts generally focus on other factors, 
such as the use of the entity’s bank accounts to pay personal expenses, failure to maintain separate records, use of 
common facilities by the owners and the companies, and inadequate capitalization”).  
 Courts clearly value and respect for corporate formalities. One empirical study showed that courts pierce 
in two-thirds of cases in which corporate formalities were not observed, but did not pierce in over ninety percent 
of cases in which formalities were observed. See Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical 
Study, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1036, 1036 (1991). 
15 Automotriz del Golfo de Cal. v. Resnick, 306 P.2d 1, 3 (1957); see 1 FLETCHER, supra note 14, § 41.30, at p. 619 
(Supp. 2002). 
16 See STEPHEN B. PRESSER, PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL § 1.5 (2009) (noting that the term was first used by Professor 
Maurice Wormser and citing Maurice Wormser, Piercing the Veil of Corporate Entity, 12 COLUM. L. REV. 496 (1912)) 
and § 1.3, at 1-12 (suggesting that the notion of limited liability for corporations was recognized in American 
common law shortly after the Revolutionary War but noting that “[t]he precise reach of corporate shareholder 
limited liability in the early United States is . . . uncertain”). 
17 See infra note 20 (discussing Thompson & Oh studies). 
18 See Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, 538 U.S. 468, 475 (2003) (noted that veil piercing is a “rare exception, applied in 
the case of fraud or certain other exceptional circumstances”).  
19 Timothy P. Glynn, Beyond “Unlimiting” Shareholder Liability: Vicarious Tort Liability for Corporate Officers, 57 
VAND. L. REV. 330, 333 (2004). 
20 The seminal study was done by Thompson in 1991; he analyzed approximately 1,600 veil-piercing cases through 
1985 and found that the corporate veil was pierced in 40.18% of the cases (or about 640 cases), but that all of 
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theory corporations with a sole or few shareholders are protected by limited liability in the 
same manner as corporations with many shareholders.21 
 B. Liability of Corporate Officers: Personal Participation 
 Under traditional corporate law doctrine, piercing of the corporate veil is used to hold 
owners (shareholders) of a corporation liable,22 not officers.23 Officers generally are shielded 
from liability for the wrongful acts of their corporation unless they personally participated in a 
tort or other wrongful acts24 “through affirmative actions of direction, sanction, or cooperation 
in the wrongful acts of commission or omission.”25 Thus, officers are not held liable based on 
those cases involved close corporations and corporate groups. See Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Corporate 
Veil: An Empirical Study, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1036, 1047-48 & table 1 (1991). See Thompson subsequently updated his 
study, adding 802 cases from 1986 through 1996; the new findings supported the original findings. Robert B. 
Thompson, Piercing the Veil within Corporate Groups: Corporate Shareholders as Mere Investors, 13 CONN. J. INT’L L. 
379, 380 & n.4 (1999).    
 Oh conducted an updated study in 2010, examining  over 2,900 cases and finding that piercing occurred in 
almost 50% of the cases, but again, only against close corporations and corporate groups. Peter B. Oh, Veil-
Piercing, 89 TEX. L. REV. 81, 110 (2010). 
21 See 1 FLETCHER, supra note 14, at § 41.35, at pp. 665-66 (“[T]he mere fact that all or almost all of the corporate 
stock is owned by an individual or a few individuals will not afford sufficient grounds for disregarding 
corporateness.”). 
22 Donsco, Inc. v. Casper Corp., 587 F.2d 602, 606 (3d Cir. 1978) (“The effects of piercing the corporate veil is to 
hold the owner liable.”); See generally STEPHEN B. PRESSER, PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL § 1.1. (SUPP. 2010); Rebecca J. 
Huss, Revamping Veil Piercing for all Limited Liability Entities: Forcing the Common Law Doctrine into the Statutory 
Age, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 95 (2001); John H. Matheson, Why Courts Pierce: An Empirical Study of Piercing the Corporate 
Veil, 7 BERKELEY BUS. L. J. 1 , 20 (2010); David Million, Piercing the Corporate Veil, Financial Responsibility, and the 
Limits of Limited Liability, 56 EMORY L.J. 1305 (2004). 
23 See Crigler v. Salac, 438 So.2d 1375, 1380 (Ala. 1983) (citing L.C.L. Theatres, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 
619 F.2d 455 (5th Cir. 1980) (individual officer liability for tortious acts “does not depend upon the same grounds as 
‘piercing the corporate veil,’ that is, inadequate capitalization, use of the corporate form for fraudulent purposes, 
or failure to comply with the formalities of corporate organization”).  
24 See Donsco, 587 F.2d at 606 (“A corporate officer is individually liable for the torts he personally commits and 
cannot shield himself behind a corporation when he is an actual participant in the tort.”). Corporate officers do not 
incur similar liability for contractual obligations arising out of corporate activities. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
AGENCY § 320 (1958) (“A person making  . . . a contract with another as agent for a disclosed principal does not 
become a party to the contract.”). 
 Parent corporations who are actively involved in the activities of their subsidiaries may be held directly 
liable for that involvement, see United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 60-61 & n.8 (1998), in addition to be held 
indirectly liable as a shareholder (owner) under piercing analysis. 
25 See JOSEPH W. BISHOP, JR., THE LAW OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS: INDEMNIFICATION AND INSURANCE § 3.13 (1982) 
(“Participation by an officer in a wrongful act of the corporation may be found not solely on the basis of direct 
action but may also consist of knowing approval or ratification of unlawful acts.”); Oswald, supra note 7, at 118 
(citing Lobato v. Pay Less Drug Stores, Inc., 261 F.2d 406, 409 (10th Cir. 1958)). For a discussion of the types of 
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their mere status as officers,26 but rather because of their active participation in wrongful 
acts,27 whether those wrongful acts consist of torts or statutory or regulatory violations.28  
 The liability of corporate officers in such instances flows directly from traditional agency 
law principles that hold an agent personally liable for his or her own tortious conduct, even if 
he or she is acting on behalf of the principal.29 Agency law provides that an individual’s active 
participation in wrongdoing can lead to personal liability, even where the individual was acting 
in an official capacity as an agent of the corporation, or at the direction of his or her principal 
and not on the agent’s own behalf.30 In such instances, the plaintiff may pursue the 
participation can lead to liability, see Martin Petrin, The Curious Case of Directors’ and Officers’ Liability for 
Supervision and Management: Exploring the Intersection of Corporate and Tort Law, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 1661, 1168-
70 (2010). 
26 See Murphy Tugboat Co. v. Shipowners & Merchants Towboat Co., 467 F. Supp. 841, 852 (N.D. Cal. 1979) 
(“Courts have, however, consistently stated that a corporate executive will not be held vicariously liable, merely by 
virtue of his office, for the torts of his corporation”), aff’d, 658 F.2d 1256 (9th Cir. 1981). Bernstein v. Starret City, 
Inc., 758 N.Y.S.2d 658, 659 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003); Bowling v. Holdeman, 413 NE.2d 1010, 1014 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980). 
27 See Escude Cruz v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 619 F.2d 902, 907 (1st Cir. 1980) (noting requirement of “personal 
involvement by the corporate officers in some decision or action which is causally related to plaintiff’s injury”); Mill 
Run Assocs. v. Locke Prop. Co., 282 F.Supp.2d 278, 287 (E.D. Pa. 2003) (noting “general, if not universal, rule . . . 
that an officer of a corporation who takes part in the commission of a tort by the corporation is personally liable 
therefor . . . .”); 3A FLETCHER, supra note 14, § 1137 (“An officer or director of a corporation is not personally liable 
for torts of the corporation or of its other officers and agents merely by virtue of holding corporate office, but can 
only incur personal liability by participating in the wrongful activity.”). The scope of director liability is not explored 
in this article. 
28 Citronelle-Mobile Gathering, Inc. v. Herrington, 826 F.2d 16, 25 (Temp. Emerg. Ct. App. 1987) (“Furthermore, 
personal responsibility for corporate liability may attach when the individual’s wrongful conduct causes the 
violation of a statute and accompanying regulations.”). 
29 Note that a corporate director (as opposed to an officer) is not the corporation’s agent and so is not at risk of 
this same type of individual liability. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 14C (2006) (“Neither the board of 
directors nor an individual director of a business is, as such, an agent of the corporation or of its members.”) As 
explained in the Restatement, the individual director “has no power of his own to act on the corporation's behalf, 
but only as one of the body of directors acting as a board. Even when he acts as a member of the board, he does 
not act as an agent, but as one of the group which supervises the activities of the corporation.” Id. cmt. b. Where 
the director also serves as an officer of the corporation, however, he or she is “necessarily an agent, and normally 
a general agent, of the corporation, since he [or she] acts on its behalf and subject to its control exercised through 
the board of directors.” Id.  This is just another variant of recognizing the different “hats” that an individual may 
wear within a corporation. 
30 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 343 (1958) (“An agent who does an act otherwise a tort is not relieved from 
liability by the fact that he acted at the command of the principal or on account of the principal . . . .”); 3A FLETCHER, 
supra  note 13, § 1135) (“An individual is personally liable for all torts which that individual committed, 
notwithstanding the person may have acted as an agent or under directions of another. This rule applies to torts 
committed by those acting in their official capacities as officers or agents of a corporation.”).  
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corporation, the individual officer, or both, and the liability of the officer will be joint and 
several with that of the corporation.31 
An officer may also be a shareholder (even the sole shareholder) of a corporation, but in 
that instance, traditional doctrine dictates that the court should recognize the different hats the 
individual is wearing and should distinguish carefully the grounds on which liability is being 
imposed.  In the leading case of Donsco, Inc. v. Casper Corp.,32 for example, the Third Circuit 
emphasized that while the individual at issue being held personally liable was both a 
shareholder and an officer, the individual’s liability stemmed from his role “as an actor rather 
than as an owner.”33 The court noted that because officer liability is not rooted in a piercing of 
the corporate veil, it was “in no way dependent upon a finding that [the corporation] is 
inadequately capitalized, that the corporation is a mere alter ego [of the individual], that the 
corporate form is being used to perpetrate a fraud, or that corporate formalities have not been 
properly complied with.”34 Rather, “[t]he only crucial predicate” to officer liability is the 
individual’s “participation in the wrongful acts.”35 
 C. Liability of the Corporation for Acts of Corporate Officers 
 Under the well-known doctrine of respondeat superior, the wrongdoing of the officer, as 
agent, can be imputed to the corporation, rendering both the individual and the corporation 
liable.  As explained in an 1858 case: 
A corporation can only act by their [sic] agents. It can act only by those who are 
in their employ. And when one in the employ of a corporation, in the business of 
his employment, does an act for their benefit, and which they adopt, and 
31 See Strang v. Hollowell, 387 S.E.2d 664, 666 (N.C. Ct. App. 1990) (citations omitted): 
It is well settled that one is personally liable for all torts committed by him, including negligence, 
notwithstanding that he may have acted as agent for another or as an officer for a corporation. 
Furthermore, the potential for corporate liability, in addition to individual liability, does not 
shield the individual tortfeasor from liability. Rather, it provides the injured party a choice as to 
which party to hold liable for the tort.  
32 587 F.2d 602 (3d Cir. 1978). 
33 Id. at 606. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. 
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approve, and take advantage of, they will be deemed to have authorized the act, 
and will be as much bound by it as though expressly authorized.36 
This is a one-way street of imputed liability, however: the corporation is liable, as the principal, 
for the actions of the officer as agent., There is no rule holding the officer liable for the 
corporation’s actions or liabilities merely because the individual holds the position of officer. 
Rather, the officer’s liability must stem from his or her own personal participation in the the 
acts creating the liability, not her or her status. 
  
II. INDIVIDUAL OFFICER LIABILITY FOR PATENT INFRINGEMENT 
 The Federal Circuit has adopted a clearly inapposite doctrine—piercing of the corporate 
veil—to assess the personal liability of corporate officers for patent infringement. As discussed 
above, piercing is a traditional corporate doctrine used to set aside the corporate form to hold 
corporate owners liable.37 While this deviation from traditional doctrine can be explained 
partially by the specialized path that patent appeals takes, the statutory framework of the 
Patent Act and the court’s desire to constrain the expansive strict liability of direct patent 
infringement more likely impel adoption of this misplaced theory. 
 A. Patent Infringement and the Role of the Federal Circuit 
  1. Infringement Liability Generally Under the Patent Act 
 Patent infringement is often described in traditional common law terms. A patent is a 
property interest of the patent holder,38 infringement of the patent is a tortious taking of that 
property, and the patent infringer is thus a tortfeasor. 39 However, overlaid on these common 
law characteristics is the specific statutory scheme of patent infringement found in the Patent 
Act of 1952.40 
36 Poppenhusen v. New York Gutta Percha Comb Co., 19 F. Cas. 1059, 1063 (C.C.S.D. N.Y. 1858). 
37 See supra Part I.A. 
38 See Dowagiac Mfg. Co. v. Minnesota Moline Plow Co., 235 U.S. 641, 648 (1915) (“[T]he exclusive right conferred 
by the patent was property, and the infringement was a tortious taking of the property.”). 
39 See, e.g., Carbice Corp. of Am. v. Am. Patents Dev. Corp., 283 U.S. 27, 33 (1931) (“Infringement, whether direct 
or contributory, is essentially a tort, and implies invasion of some right of the patentee.”); Mars, Inc. v. Coin 
Acceptors, Inc., 527 F.3d 1359, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“Patent infringement is a tort . . . .”). 
40 35 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (2012). 
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  The Patent Act addresses both direct and indirect patent infringement in separate 
sections of Section 271. In particular, Section 271(a) imposes direct infringement liability on 
“whoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within 
the United States or imports into the United States any patented invention during the term of 
the patent . . . .”41 Section 271(a) has no intent element and so direct patent infringement is a 
strict liability offense.42 While a defendant’s lack of willfulness or lack of bad faith may affect 
the availability of enhanced damages under the Patent Act,43 it does not mitigate the 
imposition of liability itself.  
 The Patent Act also contemplates two forms of indirect infringement liability (only one 
of which, inducement of infringement, is relevant to officer liability). Neither form of indirect 
infringement can exist in the absence of direct infringement by another.44 Section 271(b) 
addresses inducement of infringement and provides: “Whoever actively induces infringement 
shall be liable as an infringer.”45 The courts interpret this language as encompassing a broad 
range of actions, such as licensing, indemnification of third parties for infringement, design or 
purchase of infringing items, and repair or maintenance of infringing items.46 Unlike the strict 
liability of direct infringement, inducement of infringement has an intent element.47  
The second form of indirect liability recognized by the Patent Act is contributory 
infringement.  Section 271(c) holds liable “a party who sells a component with knowledge that 
the component is especially designed for use in a patented invention, and is not a staple article 
41 35 U.S.C. § 271(a). Utility patents typically extend for twenty years from the date of patent application. 35 U.S.C. 
§ 154.  Design patents endure for fourteen years from date of patent issuance. Id. § 173. 
42 See, e.g., Global Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB, S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060, 2065 n.2 (2011) (“Direct infringement has long 
been understood to require no more than the unauthorized use of a patented invention . . . . [A] direct infringer’s 
knowledge or intent is ‘irrelevant.’”); Jurgens v. CBK, Ltd., 80 F.3d 1566, 1570 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“Infringement 
itself . . . is a strict liability offense.”). 
43 See 35 U.S.C. § 284 (the court, in its discretion, may increase damages up to three times the amount found or 
assessed).  
44 See, e.g., Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitrim Corp., 406 U.S. 578 (1972); Joy Techs. v. Flakt, Inc., 6 F.3d 770, 774 
(Fed. Cir. 1993) (“Liability for either active inducement of infringement or for contributory infringement is 
dependent upon the existence of direct infringement.”). [The Federal Circuit seemed to call this into question in 
Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 692 F.3d 1031 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (en banc). [Note: that 
issue is before the Supreme Court right now; this footnote will be updated once that opinion is issued.] 
4535 U.S.C. § 271(b).  
46 See 17 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 17.04[4]  (citing cases). 
47 After some degree of confusion in the lower courts, the U.S. Supreme Court determined in 2011 that 
inducement of infringement “requires knowledge that the induced acts constitute patent infringement,” Global 
Tech, 131 S. Ct. at 2068, and that “knowledge” encompasses “willful blindness.” Id. at 2068-69. 
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of commerce suitable for noninfringing use.”48 The “classic” example of contributory 
infringement arises when a supplier sells a part that is necessary for and used in a patented 
product or process and that has no other use,49 knowing that the intended use is infringing.50 
Although contributory infringement also has an intent element, it focuses more on the nature 
of the item sold than upon the status of the seller, and thus is not discussed further in this 
manuscript. 
  2. The Special Case of Federal Circuit Precedent 
 The federal courts are composed primarily of courts of general jurisdiction.51 While 
most federal law issues go to the regional circuit courts of appeal, patent cases fall under the 
specialized jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit. The Federal Circuit is a relative newcomer to the 
federal court system, having been created on October 1, 1982. The creation of this specialized 
appellate court has had profound effects upon the development of patent infringement 
doctrine,52 including officer liability doctrine. 
 Prior to creation of the Federal Circuit in 1982, appeals of patent cases were taken from 
the federal district courts to the regional circuit courts of appeals, while appeals from decisions 
of the Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) were taken to the Court of Customs and Patent 
Appeals.53 Because each of the regional circuits sets its own precedents, interpretation of 
patent law could (and did) vary significantly from circuit to circuit, leading to forum-shopping by 
litigants.54 Concerns about the efficacy and efficiency of patent law, coupled with a faltering 
economy, fear of decreasing American global commercial competitiveness, and the demands of 
48 35 U.S.C. § 271(c). 
49 See Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 909 F.2d 1464, 1469 (Fed. Cir. 1990). 
50 See Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 488 (1964) (“alleged contributer [must 
know] that the combination for which his component was especially designed was infringing”). 
51 See the Judicial Act of 1891, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826 (creating basic structure of federal courts); www.uscourts.gov 
(describing current configuration of federal courts) (last visited May 24, 2014). 
52 For example, the development of multi-actor patent infringement doctrine. See Lynda J. Oswald, Simplifying 
Multiactor Patent Infringement Cases Through Proper Application of Common Law Doctrine, 51 AM. BUS. L.J. 1 
(2014). 
53 See Richard L. Revesz, Specialized Courts and the Administrative Lawmaking System, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1111, 1125 
& n.62 (1990) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (1982)). 
54 See H.R. Rep. No. 97-312, at 20 (1981) (noting “undue forum-shopping and unsettling inconsistencies” in patent 
litigation).  
11 
 
                                                          
Oswald --Officer Liability 
Draft--25 May 2014 
Please do not quote or cite without permission 
 
 
 
the patent bar and inventive community, drove Congress to create a new court—the Federal 
Circuit—that was intended to foster the development of patent doctrine. 55  
 Two characteristics in particular distinguish the Federal Circuit from its sister circuits. 
First, unlike the regional circuit courts, the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction is based solely on 
subject matter; geography plays no role. Second, the Federal Circuit has nationwide jurisdiction 
over specific subject matter, and that jurisdiction is exclusive; i.e., it is not shared with other 
intermediate appellate courts. These subject matters include, in addition to patents, an eclectic 
mishmash of other topics: international trade, government contracts, certain trademark issues, 
federal personnel issues, veteran’s benefits, and public safety officers’ benefit claims.56  
 Thus, the Federal Circuit is not exclusively a patent appellate court, which reflects a 
deliberate decision by Congress to create a specialized appellate court with a varied docket. 57 
Nonetheless, patent cases now form the largest segment of the Federal Circuit’s caseload, 
comprising 47%, or almost one-half, of the appeals filed before the Federal Circuit in FY 2013.58 
The next largest category of cases pertained to personnel actions, which comprised only 17% of 
the total number of appeals filed.59 It is not surprising, therefore, that the Federal Circuit is 
often viewed as a “patent court.”60  
Moreover, the specialized jurisdiction and patent-centric focus of the Federal Circuit’s 
caseload means that it does not see the broad range of cases presented to the regional circuits. 
This, in turn, contributes to the court’s erroneous interpretation and application of traditional 
doctrine in the context of individual officer liability for patent infringement.  
 B. The Development of Officer Patent Infringement Liability Doctrine 
55 See generally Christopher A. Cotropria, “Arising Under” Jurisdiction and Uniformity in Patent Law, 9 MICH. 
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 253, 259-61 (2003) (providing history of Federal Circuit’s creation); Paul R. Guigliuzza, 
Rethinking Federal Circuit Jurisdiction, 100 GEO. L.J. 1437, 1455-57 (2012) (same). 
56 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (2012).  
57 See S. Rep. No. 97-275, at 6 (1981): 
This rich docket assures that the work of the proposed court will be broad and diverse and not 
narrowly specialized. The judge will have no lack of exposure to a broad variety of legal 
problems. Moreover, the subject matter of the new court will be sufficiently mixed to prevent 
any special interest from dominating it. 
58 Statistics, Caseload by Category, Appeals Filed, 2013, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT (2012), at 
www.cafc.uscourts.gov/images/stories/the-court/Statistics/fy2013_filings_by_category.pdf.   
59 Id. 
60 Guigliuzza, supra  note 55,  at 1455. 
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 The development of the rules pertaining to the individual liability of corporate officers 
for patent infringement has been explored elsewhere,61 and only a brief overview is provided 
here. This development can be broken into two temporal segments: before and after formation 
of the Federal Circuit in 1982. Pre-Federal Circuit doctrine coalesced around traditional agency, 
tort, and corporate law rules; Federal Circuit doctrine, by contrast, has taken a wrong turn 
toward holding corporate officers individually liable under theories more appropriately applied 
to corporate owners. 
  1. Pre-Federal Circuit Liability Rules  
 Prior to the creation of the Federal Circuit in 1982, patent cases were heard in the 
regional circuit courts of appeal. The leading case on officer liability was Dangler v. Imperial 
Machine Co.,62 decided by the Seventh Circuit in 1926. The Dangler court noted that, at that 
point in time, the rules regarding personal liability of officers for patent infringement were 
confused and unclear.63 Plaintiffs “seldom sought” to hold individual officers liable unless the 
corporation itself was insolvent,64 and courts generally imposed liability only where the officers 
“acted outside the scope of their official duties.”65 
 Dangler was the stereotypical case: the defendant corporation declared bankruptcy 
soon after the trial court found that the patent was valid and had been infringed, leaving the 
patent owner to cast about for other parties from whom to recover.66 The two individual 
defendants were the president and secretary of the corporation; between them, they owned 
61 See generally  Ronald B. Coolley, Personal Liability of Corporate Officers and Directors for Infringement of 
Intellectual Property, 68 J. PAT. & TM. OFF. SOC’Y 228 (1986); Oswald, supra note 7; Ashley M. Fry, Note, Corporate-
Participant Liability for Direct Patent Infringement: A Look to Copyright Law’s Vicarious Liability Analysis, 2012 
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 284;  Joseph M. Sauer, Note, A Tear in the Corporate Veil: The Liability of Corporate Officers for 
Patent Infringement, 37 DUQUESNE L. REV. 89 (1998); Patrick T. Schmidt, Note, The Internalization of Corporate 
Patent Infringement: Challenging the Federal Circuit’s Approach to Corporate-Participant Liability, 88 TEX. L. REV. 
217 (2009). 
62 11 F.2d 945 (7th Cir. 1926). 
63 Id. at 946 (“the authorities are not in accord”). 
64 Id. at 947 (“The enforcement of this liability is seldom sought, except in the case of insolvency of the 
corporation.”). 
65 Id. 
66 Id. at 945. 
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40% of the corporation’s stock.67 The plaintiff contended that the individual officers should be 
held personally liable because they had operated the corporation as a shell.68 
 The Seventh Circuit disagreed, finding that managing officers of corporations were 
generally not liable for patent infringement of the corporation even if the infringement was 
“committed under their general direction.”69 However, the Dangler court went on to state, an 
officer could be held jointly liable with the corporation based upon his or her own acts: 
It is when an officer acts willfully and knowingly—that is, when he personally 
participates in the manufacture or sale of the infringing article (acts other than 
an officer), or when he uses the corporation as an instrument to carry out his 
own willful and deliberate infringements, or when he knowingly uses an 
irresponsible corporation with the purpose of avoiding personal liability—that 
officers are held jointly liable with the company.70 
The officers in Dangler were not held liable because the corporation was “a bona fide 
corporation” active in a field in which there were numerous patents (thus making it difficult for 
the corporation to evaluate whether its actions might infringe), and the corporation had sought 
appropriate legal counsel before proceeding.71 Thus, the court concluded, the case fell “far 
short of establishing any one of the situations for which the officer of the corporation may be 
held liable for the infringements of the corporation.”72 
 Dangler’s general rule that “in the absence of some special showing, the managing 
officers of a corporation are not liable for the infringements of such corporation, though 
committed under their general direction”73 was adopted by many subsequent courts.74 The 
67 Id. at 946.  
68 Id. at 945. 
69 Id. at 947. 
70 Id.  Dangler continues to be cited by the trial courts of the Seventh Circuit. See, e.g., Top Tobacco L.P. v. 
Midwestern Cash & Carry, L.L.C., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7598, at *18 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 22, 2014); Callanetics Mgt. Co. v. 
Pinckney, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 173749, at *10 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 11. 2013).  
71 11 F.2d at 948. 
72 Id.  
73 Id. at 947. 
74 See, e.g., White v. Mar-Bel, Inc., 509 F.2d 287, 292-93 (5th Cir. 1975); Telling v. Bellows-Claude Neon Co., 77 F.2d 
584, 586 (6th Cir. 1935); Dean Rubber Mfg. Co. v. Killian, 106 F.2d 316, 320 (8th Cir. 1939); S.W. Tool Co. v. Hughes 
Tools Co., 98 F.2d 42, 46 (10th Cir. 1938).  
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Dangler rule did not insulate officers from individual liability, however, and there were several 
cases in which an officer was held personally liable for infringement based upon his or her 
actions as a “moving force” behind the infringement75 or because of his or her deliberate 
participation in the infringing acts.76  
  2. Post-1982: The Development of Federal Circuit Doctrine 
 The Federal Circuit issued its first opinion on October 28, 1982, in which it adopted as 
binding precedent “the holdings of our predecessor courts, the United States Court of Claims 
and the United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, announced by those courts before 
the close of business 30 September 1982,” but declared itself not bound by the decisions of the 
regional circuit courts of appeal.77 Thus, while the Federal Circuit started out with a substantial 
body of precedent upon which to draw, it also started out with significant freedom to create 
and develop its own precedents and doctrines.  
    a. Early Federal Circuit Cases: Erroneous Adoption of Piercing 
Analysis  
 Officer liability issues arose before the Federal Circuit soon after its creation, and just as 
quickly took a wrong analytical turn that continues to plague officer liability doctrine. The first 
such case to come before the Federal Circuit was Orthokinetics, Inc. v. Safety Travel Chairs, 
Inc.,78 in 1986.  The Orthokinetics court found that three individuals, all officers and 
shareholders of two corporations accused of infringement, could be held individually liable for 
75 See, e.g., White, 509 F.2d at 292-93 (defendant “was the incorporator, president, majority stockholder, and 
moving force which resulted in the manufacture of the accused device [and] participated in the manufacture and 
sale of his machine”); International Mfg. Co. v. Landon, Inc., 336 F.2d 723, 728-29 (9th Cir. 1964) (defendant-officer 
was the “moving active conscious force” behind the corporation’s infringement and “is therefore subject to 
personal liability without regard to whether [the corporation” is his alter ego); Marks v. Polaroid Corp., 237 F.2d 
428, 435 (1st Cir. 1956) (defendant-officer “was the moving, active conscious force behind” the corporation’s 
infringement). 
76 See, e.g., Bewal, Inc. v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 292 F.2d 159, 167 (10th Cir. 1961) (corporate officers who 
“wilfully and knowingly participate in, induce and approve of acts of infringement . . . are liable with the 
corporation for the wrongful acts”); Weller Mfg. Co. v. Wen Prods. Inc., 232 F.2d 795, 801 (7th Cir. 1956) (holding 
liable defendant-officer who deliberately designed the infringing product and who “was at all times in control of 
the administrative and managerial policy of the corporation”); Southwestern Tool Co. v. Hughes Tool Co., 98 F.2d 
42, 45-46 (10th Cir. 1938) (holding liable defendant-officer who used the corporation “as an instrument to carry out 
his own deliberate infringement”). 
77 S. Corp. v. United States, 690 F.2d 1368, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 1982) (en banc). 
78 806 F.2d 1565, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1986).  
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direct infringement under Section 271(a) and for inducement of infringement under Section 
271(b).79 
 The Orthokinetics court began by examining the officers’ liability for direct infringement 
under Section 271(a) of the Patent Act, making two conflicting statements with regard to such 
liability. First, the court stated that “[i]nfringement is a tort and officers of corporation are 
personally liable for tortious conduct of the corporation if they personally took part in the 
commission of the tort or specifically directed other officers, agents, or employees of the 
corporation to commit the tortious act.”80 This statement is, of course, a reiteration of the 
general principles of general tort and agency law that typically govern the personal liability of 
corporate officers81 and is unobjectionable on its face. 
 However, the Orthokinetics court went on to state that evaluating the personal liability 
of corporate officers “under § 271(a) requires invocation of those general principles relating to 
piercing the corporate veil.”82 In doing so, the court muddled doctrine relating to owner liability 
(piercing) with that relating to officer liability (personal participation).  Moreover, the court’s 
recitation of the facts indicated that the court did not give sufficient weight to the different 
roles that individuals can play within a corporation—i.e., as shareholders (owners) and 
managers (officers)—and the differing standards of liability that should apply to each such role. 
For example, the court emphasized that the individuals were the sole owners of the 
corporations at issue, yet did not discuss evidence of abuse of the corporate form that would 
permit the court to pierce the corporate veil and hold those individuals personally liable.83 
Rather, the court emphasized that the individuals “were directly responsible for the design and 
production of the infringing [products] and that they were the only ones who stood to benefit 
from sales of those [products].”84 
 It is hard to divine the relevance of these two factors for either officer or owner liability. 
The mere fact that a corporate owner is in a position to benefit from the sale of an infringing 
device is insufficient grounds to impose liability upon him or her: 
79 Id. 
80 Id. at 1579. 
81 See supra Part I.B. 
82 Id. at 1579. 
83 See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text (discussing piercing) 
84 Orthokinetics, 806 F.2d at 1579.  
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Even in their role as shareholders, the individuals are not automatically liable 
simply because they are likely to profit monetarily from the corporation’s 
infringing acts. A rule so holding would make all shareholders automatically 
personally liable if illegal or infringing acts of the corporation led to financial 
gain, even if those acts were unintentional or inadvertent. Rather, the additional 
indicia needed to pierce the corporate veil must be shown before shareholders 
forfeit the protection of the corporate form.85 
The relevance of monetary benefit is even more attenuated in the officer liability context, 
where every officer can be said to benefit from the corporation’s profitability and financial 
stability, if only in the sense of an enhanced likelihood of employment, but where the officer 
has no direct claim on the corporation’s profits, as would a shareholder.  
 The Orthokinetics court’s consideration of the individual’s “direct[] responsib[ility] for 
the design and production of the infringing”86 items is equally perplexing as a factor relating to 
officer liability. Although direct participation in a tortious act can lead to individual officer 
liability, the Orthokinetics court did not inquire into such direct participation by the corporate 
officers, seeming instead to ground its analysis in the fact that the individuals, as officers, had 
the authority to control the corporation’s acts. In so doing, the Orthokinetics court opened the 
door to a broad statement of officer liability, as officers always have the authority to control the 
corporation. 
 The Orthokinetics court then turned its attention to the officers’ liability for indirect 
infringement under Section 271(b), once again incorrectly interjecting corporate owner liability 
standards into corporate officer liability analysis. The court stated: “it is well settled that 
corporate officers who actively aid and abet their corporation’s infringement may be personally 
liable for inducing infringement under § 271(b) regardless of whether the corporation is the 
alter ego of the corporate officer.” This, of course, suggests that an officer can be the alter ego 
of the corporation; the alter ego theory, however, requires a “unity of interest and ownership” 
held only by corporate owners.87 Certainly, an officer can be liable for inducement of 
infringement under Section 271(b), but that liability is grounded in the officer’s own acts of 
aiding and abetting direct infringement by the corporation, and requires a showing of intent.88 
85 Oswald, supra note 7, at 132. 
86 806 F.2d at 1578. 
87 Automotriz, 306 P.2d at 3-4. 
88 See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text (discussing inducement of infringement). 
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 The Orthokinetic court’s erroneous adoption of piercing analysis and alter ego theory to 
reach corporate officers quickly took firm root in Federal Circuit case law. In Manville Sales 
Corp. v. Paramount Systems, Inc.,89 in 1990, the court found that two corporate officers90 were 
not liable for direct infringement under Section 271(a) because the required “evidence to justify 
piercing the corporate veil” was not present.91 The Manville court stated that “[a]lthough facts 
support the conclusion that the officers had knowledge of their acts, these acts were within the 
scope of their employment and thus were protected by the corporate veil.”92 The Manville 
court also found that the district court had erred in imposing individual liability upon the 
officers even though the district court had found that the officers were not the alter ego of the 
corporation.93 Thus, the Manville court displayed a complete lack of understanding of the 
differing roles of owners and officers in corporations, and the differing standards of liability that 
apply to each such role. 
 The Federal Circuit attempted to correct its wrong direction on officer liability in Hoover 
Group, Inc. v. Custom Metalcraft, Inc.94 in 1996, but the remedial measures were short-lived. 
While Orthokinetics had held that officers could be personally liable under “general principles 
relating to piercing the corporate veil,”95 Hoover Group sought to constrain this holding by 
noting that when an officer is acting within the scope of his or her responsibility, those acts “are 
not always sufficient grounds for penetrating the corporate protection and imposing personal 
liability,”96 and that piercing the corporate veil to impose personal liability upon officers was 
appropriate “only in limited circumstances.”97 Rather, the Hoover Group court stated, “[w]hen a 
person in a control position causes the corporation to commit a civil wrong, imposition of 
89 917 F.2d 544 (Fed. Cir. 1990). 
90 The appellate court looked only the actions of these individuals in their role as officers, and did not address 
whether they were also shareholders. Id. at 553-54. 
91 Id. at 552.  
92 Id. at 553. The Manville court cited A. Stucki Co. v. Worthington Industries, Inc., 849 F.2d 593 (Fed. Cir. 1988), a 
1988 Federal Circuit decision that addressed the liability of a parent corporation for a subsidiary’s patent 
infringement—in other words, a classic example of using piercing to reach a corporate owner. 
93 Id. The Manville court cited a 1967 Third Circuit decision, Zubik v. Zubik, 384 F.2d 267  (3d Cir. 1967), which 
evaluated the liability of an individual in his capacity as a shareholder for the torts of his closely-held corporation. 
Id.   
94 84 F.3d 1408 (Fed. Cir. 1996).  
95 Id. at 1411. 
96 Id. (citing Manville, 917 F.2d at 553).  
97 Id. 
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personal liability requires consideration of the nature of the wrong, the culpability of the act, 
and whether the person acted in his/her personal interest or in that of the corporation.”98 
Although the use of the term “control” is concerning because of its lack of precision,99 and 
suggests that mere ability to control, rather than actual exercise of the same, is sufficient, the 
remainder of the state articulates the correct rule: an officer may be held personally liable for 
his or her personal participation in the wrongdoing.  
 Unfortunately, while Hoover Group seemed to be backing away from the statements in 
Orthokinetics and Manville that individual liability can only be based in a piercing of the 
corporate veil, it did not completely jettison application of piercing analysis to corporate 
officers. Rather, the Hoover Group court found that individual officer liability for direct 
infringement under Section 271(a) could be based in either a piercing of the corporate veil or 
personal participation by the corporate officer100—effectively, getting only one-half of the 
analysis correct. Moreover, the court’s explanation for why the officers involved were not liable 
was inaccurate; further, it erroneously indicated that officer liability could not be imposed in 
the absence of veil piercing: 
 Unless the corporate structure is a sham, as is not here asserted, 
personal liability for inducement to infringe is not automatic but must be 
supported by personal culpability. The district court did not find bad faith or 
fraud or culpable intent on the part of [the individual]. The court erred in 
imposing liability although the corporate veil was not pierced.101 
 The Federal Circuit’s next foray into officer liability, in Al-Site Corp. v. VSI International, 
Inc.,102 decided in 1999, returned Federal Circuit doctrine firmly back to the erroneous 
precedents set in Orthokinetics and Manville. The Al-Site Corp. court noted that “[p]ersonal 
liability under § 271(a) . . . requires sufficient evidence to justify piercing the corporate veil,”103 
and that”[t]he most common reason” for ignoring the corporate form is that the “‘corporation 
was merely the alter ego of its officers.’”104 The plaintiff had sued a corporation and its 
98 Id. (emphasis added) (citing 3A FLETCHER, supra note 14, at §§ 1134-1166 (rev. vol., West 1994)). 
99 See infra Part IV. 
100 84 F.3d at 1411-22. 
101 Id. at 1412. 
102 174 F.3d 1308 (Fed. Cir 1999). 
103 Id. at 1331 (citing Manville, 917 F.2d at 552). 
104 Id. 
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chairman and chief executive officer, Myron Orlinksy, for infringement of a patent on hanger 
tags used on a display rack for eyeglasses. Although Orlinsky had “made the sole decision to 
continue using the hanger tags” after the corporation had received a cease and desist letter 
from the plaintiff,105 he did so in “a good faith belief of noninfringement engendered by advice 
of counsel.”106 This, the Federal Circuit concluded, was insufficient to demonstrate that the 
corporation operated as the officer’s “alter ego” or to support a piercing of the corporate 
veil.107   
b. Recent Federal Circuit Decisions: Solidifying Incorrect Officer 
Liability Doctrine 
 The damaging, and seemingly permanent, legacy of the wrong path initiated by the 
Orthokinetics court can be seen in recent Federal Circuit cases addressing officer liability for 
patent infringement. For example, in Wechsler v. Macke Int’l Trade, Inc.,108 decided in 2006, the 
Federal Circuit failed to explicitly discuss the distinction between owner and officer liability in 
evaluating individual patent infringement liability.  Anthony O’Rourke was the president, sole 
stockholder, and sole employee of Macke International Trade, Inc.109 The district court granted 
summary judgment that Macke was not O’Rourke’s alter ego.110 The appellate court affirmed, 
but without explicitly stating whether it was looking at O’Rourke’s role as an owner or as an 
officer.111  
105 Id.at 1314. 
106 Id. at 1331.  
107 Id. 
108 486 F.3d 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
109 Id. at 1289. 
110 The trial court had granted judgment as a matter of law (“JMOL”) that O’Rourke was personally liable for 
inducing Macke’s infringement of the patent.  The trial court found that Special Verdict No. 1 (that O’Rourke was 
not personally liable for inducing Macke’s infringement) was inconsistent with Special Verdict No. 3 (that O’Rourke 
and Macke willfully infringed the patent). The trial court’s solution was to “essentially discard[]” Special Verdict No. 
1.  Id.at 1290  
111 There was a second issue involving inducement and willful infringement in the case that is beyond the scope of 
this paper. At trial, the jury found that O’Rourke was not personally liable for infringement, but that the 
“defendants” willfully infringed. The district court granted judgment as a matter of law (“JMOL”) that individual 
was personally liable for infringement on the grounds that a corporation does not act independently of its sole 
principal and that a finding of willful infringement by the corporation is necessarily a finding of willful infringement 
by that principal as well. The appellate court reversed, finding that the trial court’s logic—that “a person that 
incorporates him or herself to conduct business can never escape personal liability for willful infringement by the 
corporation,” id. at 1292,—was erroneous. Rather, the appellate court noted, the standard for personal liability is 
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 The Weschler court began by addressing the source of applicable law. Corporate and 
agency law doctrines stem from state, not federal, doctrine. Because these doctrines (including 
alter ego doctrine) are not unique to patent law (which is, of course, exclusively federal law), 
the Federal Circuit applies the law of the regional circuit in which the case originated.112 The 
law of the Ninth Circuit thus applied here, and that regional circuit in turn applies the law of the 
forum state, which in this instance was California.113 California’s jurisprudence regards 
application of the alter ego doctrine as an extraordinary measure and applies it “only 
reluctantly and cautiously,”114 requiring both “‘a unity of interest and ownership [such] that the 
individuality, or separateness, of the said person and the corporation has ceased,’” and a 
finding that “‘an adherence to the fiction of the separate existence of the corporation would . . . 
sanction a fraud or promote injustice.’”115  
 While the plaintiff argued that O’Rourke’s status as sole owner, director, and officer of 
Macke supported a piercing of the corporate veil,116 the appellate court noted that sole 
ownership is insufficient grounds for a piercing; rather, “[b]ad faith in one form or another” was 
based upon “personal culpability” and “requires the officer to have possessed a specific intent to ‘aid and abet’ the 
infringement”, id. at 1292 (citing Water Techs. Corp., 850 F.2d at 668); as such, it is distinct from the willful 
infringement inquiry of “whether the infringer had a good faith belief that the patent was invalid and/or not 
infringed.” Id. (citing SRI Intern., Inc. v. Advanced Tech. Labs., Inc., 127 F.3d 1462, 1464 (Fed. Cir. 1997)). 
Interestingly, the appellate court’s rather muddled analysis seemed to suggest that the appellate court was 
implicitly recognizing the distinction between the liability of owners (where the corporation must be a “sham”) and 
the liability of officers (which requires personal culpability), albeit in the specific context of willful infringement: 
 Under the district court’s logic, a person that incorporate s him or herself to conduct 
business can never escape liability for willful infringement by the corporation. This is inconsistent 
with our case law. Unless the corporate structure is a sham, we have held that personal liability 
for inducement must be supported by personal culpability. This requires the officer to have 
possessed a specific intent to “aid and abet” the infringement. A primary consideration for willful 
infringement, on the other hand, is whether the infringer had a good faith belief that the patent 
was invalid and/or not infringed. The two standards are not the same. For example, a corporate 
officer could negligently believe that a patent was invalid and/or not infringed. This might 
support a finding of willful infringement by the corporation, but not a finding of personal liability 
for the officer. 
Id. at 1292 (citations omitted).  
112 Id. at 1295 (citing Insituform Techs., Inc. v. CAT Contracting, Inc., 385 F.3d 1360, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citing 
Panduit Corp. v. All States Plastic Mfg. Co., 744 F.2d 1564, 1574-75 (Fed. Cir. 1984)).  
113 Id. (citing Towe Antique Ford Found. v. IRS, 999 F.2d 1387, 1391 (9th Cir. 1993)). 
114 Id. (citing Las Palmas Assocs. v. Las Palmas Ctr. Assocs., 235 Cal. App. 3d 1220, 1249, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 301 (1991)). 
115 Id. (citing Firstmark Capital Corp. v. Hempel Fin. Corp., 859 F.2d 92, 94 99th Cir. 1988) (ellipses in Weschler). 
116 Id. at 1295 (citing Carlesimo v. Schwebel, 197 P.2d 167 (1948). 
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required.117 The plaintiff put forth five arguments in support of piercing: (1) the corporation 
was undercapitalized; (2) O’Rourke as an individual held the assets while the corporation held 
the liabilities; (3) O’Rourke treated corporate assets as his own; (4) O’Rourke held himself out 
as liable for the corporation’s debts; and (5) O’Rourke used the corporate identity to defraud 
creditors.118 However, the appellate court found that none of these assertions raised a genuine 
issue of material fact119 and that no reasonable jury could have found that Macke was the alter 
ego of O’Rourke, making the trial court’s grant of summary judgment correct.120 
 The appellate court’s analysis in Wechsler was a correct application of piercing analysis 
in the context of O’Rourke’s status as a shareholder. However, the plaintiff lumped owner and 
officer liability together, and the appellate court never drew the explicit distinctions that would 
clarify: (1) that piercing and alter ego doctrine was relevant to O’Rourke only in his status as a 
corporate owner, and (2) that any liability that might attach to him in his role as corporate 
officer would have to be based on personal participation (or personal “culpability,” as the 
Wechsler court called it). 
  In 2010, a chink in the Federal Circuit’s piercing doctrine began to emerge in Wordtech 
Systems v. Integrated Networks Solutions.121 Although the Federal Circuit again applied a 
piercing analysis to individual officers, this time the court also hinted at the problematic nature 
of its precedent.  The corporation at issue was a small family business, managed by the two 
sons of the founder, both of who denied they were officers but admitted they ran the 
company.122  The jury had found the corporation and two individual defendants liable for direct 
patent infringement, as well as for inducement of infringement and contributory 
infringement.123 
117 Id.  
118 Id.  
119 Id. at 1295. 
120 Id. at 1297. 
121 609 F.3d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
122 Id. at 1311. 
123 Id. at 1310.  With regard to the contributory infringement issue, the court found that while the corporate form 
“does not shield officers from liability for personally participating in contributory infringement,” id. at 1317, the 
plaintiff had failed to provide proof of the necessary elements for such infringement, thus necessitating remand for 
new trial. Id. Contributory infringement is not considered further in this article. 
22 
 
                                                          
Oswald --Officer Liability 
Draft--25 May 2014 
Please do not quote or cite without permission 
 
 
 
 On appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed and remanded the case124 because the trial 
court had failed to provide jury instructions on piercing of the corporate veil125—and piercing, 
under Federal Circuit precedent, was necessary to impose direct liability upon individual 
officers under Section 271(a).126 The Wordtech court noted in a footnote that commentators 
have argued that veil piercing does not apply to officers,127 but found that it could not address 
that issue in the case before it for two reasons. First, the parties had not argued that the 
individuals were owners, nor did the parties draw any distinctions between owner and officer 
liability.128 Second, unless and until until this issue is raised and addressed en banc by the 
Federal Circuit, panels are bound by previous precedent, which is the piercing theory 
articulated in Orthokinetics.129 Thus, the Wordtech court suggested that veil piercing is not the 
proper test for officers, yet failed to develop this analysis.  
 Imposition of personal liability upon the two individuals in the absence of instructions 
about whether the entity was indeed a valid corporation and about piercing of the corporate 
veil was, in the appellate court’s view, “plain error that requires a new trial,” as the plaintiff 
bore the burden of showing that either the entity was not a valid corporation when the 
individuals committed infringing acts on its behalf (and thus was not protected by limited 
liability) or that the corporation was valid and its veil should be pierced under state law.130  
 With regard to the inducement of infringement claim, the Wordtech court stated that 
“[t]he corporate veil can shield officers from liability under § 271(a),”131 but that “‘corporate 
officers who actively assist with their corporation’s infringement may be personally liable for 
inducing infringement regardless of whether the circumstances are such that a court should 
disregard the corporate entity and pierce the corporate veil.”132 The court highlighted, in a 
footnote, its discomfort the differing rules for officer liability under Section 271(a) (which 
requires piercing) and Section 271(b) (which does not) as well as the differing treatment of 
124 Id. (noting that on remand, the trial court was to address, inter alia, “ the issues of piercing [the entity’s] 
corporate veil and [the entity’s] corporate status”). 
125 Id. at 1314. 
126 Id. at 1313 (citing Orthokinetics, 806 F.2d at 1579). 
127 Id. at n.2 (citing [Oswald, supra note 7). 
128 Id.  
129 Id. 
130 Id. at 1314. 
131 Id. at 1315-16. 
132 Id. at 1316 (citing Manville, 917 F.2d at 553; Hoover, 84 F.3d at 1412). 
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officer and owner liability under existing precedent, but noted that the issues could not be 
resolved on the record before it and so were “left for another day.”133 
 The Federal Circuit’s most recent discussion of individual officer liability for patent 
infringement came in Hall v. Bed Bath and Beyond, Inc.134 in 2013. The discussion there was 
brief and more of a casual aside.  Nonetheless, the case reconfirms the Federal Circuit’s 
incorrect path for officer individual liability, thus compounding a series of errors in the law. 
 The plaintiff in Hall sued Bed, Bath & Beyond for design patent infringement, also 
alleging inducement of infringement by Farley Nachemin, the Vice-President and General 
Merchandise Manager. The plaintiff cited Orthokinetics’ language that “‘it is well settled that 
corporate officers who actively aid and abet their corporation’s infringement may be personally 
liable for inducing infringement under § 271(b) regardless of whether the corporation is the 
alter ego of the corporate officer.’”135 The Hall court rejected the imposition of liability on the 
officer on the basis of New York veil-piercing doctrine, which requires a “‘two-part showing: (i) 
that the owner exercised complete domination over the corporation with respect to the 
transaction at issue; and (ii) that such domination was used to commit a fraud or wrong that 
injured the party seeking to pierce the veil.’”136 Thus, the New York doctrine itself revealed that 
veil-piercing is relates to owner liability, not officer liability,137 and thus was inapposite to the 
case before it, where the individual was clearly liable only as an officer, not an owner. 
Ultimately, the Federal Circuit did not reach the merits of this argument. The district court had 
dismissed the action against the individual on the grounds that the allegedly infringing activity 
by the individual had occurred before the patent had issued and thus was not actionable. The 
Federal Circuit affirmed the dismissal on these procedural timing grounds.  
 C. Summary 
 Why does the Federal Circuit persist in applying the blatantly incorrect piercing doctrine 
to the evaluation of the personal liability of corporate officers for patent infringement? One 
133 Id. at 1316 n.3. 
134 705 F.3d 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2013). 
135 Id. at 1365 (quoting Orthokinetics, 806 F.2d at 1578-79)). 
136 Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Am. Fuel Corp. v. Utah Energy Dev. Co., 122 F.2d 130, 134 (2d Cir. 1997)). 
137 And, in fact, a parenthetical to the Second Circuit opinion cited by the Hall court in support of its holding also 
talks in terms of owner liability, when it discusses piercing the corporate veil in order to hold a parent corporation 
liable for the acts of the subsidiary. Wm. Passalacqua Builders, Inc. v. Resnick Developers South, Inc., 933 F.2d 131, 
138 (2d Cir. 1991). 
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answer might be that the Federal Circuit, as a specialized federal appellate court, has little 
opportunity to interact with traditional corporate law doctrine across a wide variety of settings 
(as do the regional circuit courts of appeal). A search of the Federal Circuit’s decisions available 
on Lexis from the inception of the Federal Circuit  in 1982 to March 16, 2014, revealed a total of 
24 majority opinions and two dissents in which piercing of the corporate veil was addressed in 
substantive detail.138 Of those 24 majority opinions, 21 of them addressed patent law issues.139 
The remaining three consisted of an appeal from the Court of International Trade,140 
bankruptcy,141 and a debt collection claim under the Small Business Act.142 
 However, as the next Part illustrates, the regional circuit courts of appeal also apply 
inapposite theories in assessing the individual liability of corporate officers for copyright 
infringement, although their errors take them down a different analytical path. The fact that 
138 The terms “pierc!”, “corporate,” and “veil” were searched in Federal Circuit cases LEXIS Advance from 1982 to 
March 16, 2014, resulting in 365 cases. The search was then narrowed to “corporate veil,” resulting in 35 cases. 
Those cases were examined to determine if the rationale behind veil piercing was discussed in substantial detail, or 
whether the doctrine was only referred to in a cursory manner, without analysis. 
139 See Taurus IP, LLC v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 726 F.3d 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (reverse piercing); Hall v. Bed Bath & 
Beyond, Inc., 705 F.3d 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2013);  Kippen v. Pack, 491 Fed. Appx. 187 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Wordtech Sys. v. 
Integrated Network Solutions, Inc., 609 F.3d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Dow Jones & Co. v. Ablaise Ltd., 606 F.3d 1338 
(Fed. Cir. 2010); Tiger Teams Techs., Inc. v. Synesi Group, Inc., 371 Fed. Appx. 90 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Weschler v. 
Macke Int’l Trade, Inc., 486 F.3d 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Insituform Techs. v. CAT Constr., Inc., 385 F.3d 1360 (Fed. 
Cir 2004); Sys. Div., Inc. v. Teknek Elecs., Ltd., 253 Fed. Appx. 31 (Fed. Cir 2007);Tegal Corp. v. Tokyo Electron Co., 
2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 1992 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 1, 2002); In re Al-Site Corp., 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 2537 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 1, 
2000) (writ of mandamus); Al-Site Corp. v. VSI Int’l, Inc., 174 F.3d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 1999); 3D Sys. V. Aarotech Labs., 
Inc., 160 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Phonometrics, Inc. v. Resinter N. Am. Corp., 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 26574 (Fed. 
Cir. Sept. 17, 1997);  Semiconductor Energy Lab. Co. v. Samsung Elecs. Am., 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 15005 (Fed. Cir. 
June 23, 1997) (reverse piercing); Hoover Group v. Custom Metalcraft, 84 F.3d 1408 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Nam Jin Yeu v. 
Kim, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 17880 (Fed. Cir. July 31, 1991);  Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Sys., 917 F.2d 544, 
552 (Fed. Cir. 1990); A. Stucki Co. v. Worthington Industries, Inc., 849 F.2d 593 (Fed. Cir. 1988);  Orthokinetics, Inc. 
v. Safety Travel Chairs, Inc., 806 F.2d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1986); Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Eco Chem., 757 F.2d 1256 
(Fed. Cir. 1985). 
 Three dissenting opinions also raised piercing. See Hunt Trust Estate v. United States, 470 F.3d 1044 (Fed. 
Cir. 2006) Gajarsa, J., dissenting); Cygnus Telecoms. Tech., LLC v. Totalaxcess.com, Inc., 345 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 
2003) (Prost, J., dissenting); Ohio Cellular Prods. Corp. v. Adams USA, Inc., 175 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (Newman, 
J., dissenting).  
140 See United States v. Trek Leather, Inc., 724 F.3d 1330 (Fed. Cir 2013) (stating that piercing and alter ego theory 
are avenues for evaluating a corporate officer’s liability for the corporation’s violation of 19 U.S.C. § 1592(a)). 
141 See Institut Pasteur v. Cambridge Biotech Corp., 186 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (bankruptcy court properly 
pierced to reach parent of a wholly owned subsidiary in a patent licensing case). 
142 See McCall Stock Farms v. United States, 14 F.3d 1562 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (finding Small Business Administration’s 
decision to piece the corporate veil of a parent corporation was not arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or 
otherwise not in accordance with law). 
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both copyright and patent law use analytically incorrect theories to assess officer liability 
suggests that while the Federal Circuit’s specialized jurisdiction might be one factor in the 
incorrect articulation of officer liability for patent infringement, other factors are likely at play 
as well.  
III. INDIVIDUAL OFFICER LIABILITY FOR COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT 
 Individual officer liability in the copyright arena has received less scholarly attention 
than in the patent arena. This is likely at least in part because the courts house officer liability 
for copyright infringement in vicarious liability, which, on its face, at least, appears to be a more 
doctrinally sound theory, less in need of commentary and criticism. However, closer 
examination reveals that that vicarious liability theory used for officer liability for copyright 
infringement also rests on shaky theoretical foundations.  
 In many ways, copyright infringement looks similar to patent infringement. Infringement 
of the copyright is a tort, and the copyright infringer is a tortfeasor.143 However, the avenue for 
appeals is different in patent and copyright cases. While appeals in patent cases are heard by a 
specialized intermediate appellate court—the Federal Circuit—appeals in copyright cases go to 
the regional circuit courts of appeal. Two significant consequences flow from this difference. 
First, because there are multiple circuit courts involved, each of which sets its own precedent, 
there is a potential for circuit splits in copyright law that does not exist in patent law.144 Thus, 
copyright law tends to be less uniform than patent law, which emanates from a single 
intermediate appellate court. 
143 See Ted Browne Music Co. v. Fowler, 290 F. 751, 754 (2d Cir. 1923) (“Courts have long recognized that 
infringement of a copyright is a tort, and all persons concerned therein are jointly and severally liable as such joint 
tort-feasors.”). Whether a copyright is a property interest is subject to some debate. See, e.g., Tom W. Bell, 
Copyright as Intellectual Privilege, 58 SYRACUSE L. REV. 523 (2007-08) (arguing copyright should be viewed as a 
privilege, not a property interest); Richard Epstein, Liberty v. Property? Cracks in the Foundation of Copyright Law, 
42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1 (2005) (offering Lockean justification for copyright as property); Adam Mossoff, Is Copyright 
Property?, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 29 (2005) (summarizing debate about whether copyright is property and arguing 
digital copyrights are property). 
144 Such circuit splits provide rich fodder for student commentators. See, e.g., Jonathan L. Kennedy, Note, Double 
Standard and Facilitated Forum Shopping: A Historical Approach to Resolving the Circuit Split on Copyright 
Registration Timing, 60 DRAKE L. REV. 305 (2011-12) (discussing circuit split in acts required to satisfy the 
registration requirements of § 411(a) of Copyright Act); Emily A. Caldwell, Note, Can the Application of Laches 
Violate the Separation of Powers? A Surprising Answer from a Copyright Circuit Split, 44 VAL. U. L. REV. 469 (2010)  
(discussing circuit split in whether a plaintiff can be barred from brining a suit within the Copyright Act’s 3-year 
statute of limitations by the equitable doctrine of laches); Shana Dines, Note, Actual Interpretation Yields “Actual 
Dissemination”: An Analysis of the “Make Available” Theory Argued in Peer-to-Peer File-sharing Lawsuits, and Why 
Courts Ought to Reject It, 32 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L., J. 157 (2009) (discussing circuit split in whether unauthorized 
distribution for purposes of copyright law requires that work be “actually disseminated” versus “made available”). 
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 Second, because the regional circuit courts are generalist, not specialized, courts, they 
hear cases across a much more diverse range of topics. They are far more likely than the 
Federal Circuit to hear cases posing issues of traditional corporate, agency, and tort law 
concepts and in a much broader expanse of settings. This suggests that the regional circuits 
should be more adept than the Federal Circuit in correctly applying traditional doctrine to 
federal intellectual property issues. In fact, however, while courts seldom turn to application of 
piercing doctrine to hold corporate officers liable for copyright infringement,145 copyright 
infringement cases do reveal other articulations of officer liability that are at odds with 
traditional doctrine.  
 A. Infringement Liability Under Copyright Law 
 As in patent law, it is not difficult in copyright law to impute infringement liability for the 
acts of officers to the corporation. Traditional corporate, agency, and tort doctrines apply, and 
respondeat superior is invoked to hold the master (e.g., the corporation) liable for the infringing 
acts of the agent (employee or officer).146 The more difficult and provocative question in 
copyright law, like patent law, is under which circumstances should the officer be held 
individually liable for infringement—a question made more complicated in the copyright area 
by the Copyright Act’s more limited statutory infringement provisions. 
  1. Direct Infringement 
The statutory language of the Copyright Act provides for direct infringement (but not 
indirect, i.e., secondary, infringement).147 The actor who engages in infringing actions under the 
Copyright Act (such as reproduction, distribution, or copying148) is liable as a direct infringer.149  
Direct copyright infringement, like direct patent infringement, is a strict liability,150 although the 
strict liability in copyright is, in a sense, less “strict” than in patent because of the presence of 
145 See infra Part III.B.3.  
146 Id. (citations omitted); see also Disney Enterprises, Inc. v. Hotfile Corp., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 172339 (S.D. Fla. 
Aug. 28, 2013) (“Vicarious copyright liability has been described as a variation of the doctrine of respondeat 
superior—a form of strict liability premised on agency.”) (citing Fonavisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, 76 F.3d 259, 263 
(9th Cir. 1996). 
147 15 U.S.C. § 501(a) (“Anyone who violates any of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner . . .  is an infringer of 
the copyright . . . .”).  
148 See 15 U.S.C. § 106 (defining exclusive rights belonging to the copyright holder). 
149 See generally NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 12.04[A][1] (2014). 
150 See Educ. Testing Serv. V. Simon, 95 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 1087 (C.D. Cal. 1999) (copyright infringement is a “strict 
liability tort”); 6 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 21:81 (2010). 
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the fair use defense. The elements of strict liability “make out the prima facie case of 
[copyright] infringement.”151 That prima facie case can be overcome, however, by a defendant 
who can show “fair use.” Thus, a defendant is held liable if he or she “is at fault, that is, not a 
fair user.”152  
   2. Indirect Liability Under the Copyright Act 
 Unlike the Patent Act,153 the Copyright Act defines only direct infringement 
statutorily154; indirect, or secondary, infringement is addressed solely through case law.155 The 
case law has evolved such that indirect liability for copyright infringement now takes one of two 
forms: (1) “vicarious liability,” which imposes liability upon a party who “has the right and 
ability to supervise the infringing activity and also has a direct financial interest in such 
activities,”156 and (2) “contributory infringement,” which imposes liability upon a party who has 
“knowledge of the infringing activity [and] induces, causes or materially contributes to the 
infringing conduct of another”157 (and which in generally viewed as a subset of vicarious 
liability.158 Thus, indirect copyright infringement, which speaks of “vicarious liability” and 
“contributory infringement,” is similar to, but does not quite parallel, indirect patent 
infringement, which statutorily defines “inducement of infringement” and “contributory 
infringement.” 
Unfortunately, in practice, the categories of direct and indirect copyright infringement 
do not line up as neatly as the preceding discussion might suggest. The Sony Court noted in 
1984 that the “‘lines between direct infringement, contributory infringement, and vicarious 
liability are not clearly drawn.’”159 In fact, the Sony Court used contributory infringement and 
vicarious liability interchangeably, reasoning that the second is merely a subcategory of the 
151 Steven Hetcher, The Immorality of Strict Liability in Copyright, 17 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1, 2 (2013). 
152 Id. 
153 See 35 U.S.C. § 271(infringement of patent provisisons). 
154 See 15 U.S.C. § 501(a) (direct infringement of copyright). 
155 See Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 435 (1984). See generally Ryan Pohlman, Note, 
Inducement and Grokster: Guarding against the Pitfalls of Copyright Owners’ New Weapon, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 1309, 
1310-12 (2006). 
156 Gershwin Publ’g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971). See also Lewis Galoob 
Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 964 F.2d 965, 970 (9th Cir. 1992). 
157 Id.  
158 See Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 435 (quoted at note 167 infra). 
159 Id. at 437 n.17 (quoting district court, 480 F. Supp. at 457-58).   
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first.160 A leading copyright treatise notes that the boundaries between contributory and 
vicarious liability “are often fluid.”161 This lack of clear delineation is particularly problematic in 
the area of officer liability, where the distinctions between the independent roles of officers 
and shareholders are often ignored by courts. 
 The courts do not view the lack of formal statutory language as an impediment to 
imposition of indirect liability for copyright infringement. However, the absence of explicit 
statutory language has caused indirect copyright infringement to evolve through the courts in a 
messy and chaotic manner, as the courts have drawn upon both general tort and agency 
doctrine and have analogized to statutory patent infringement liability in devising liability for 
indirect copyright infringement under the common law. This leads the courts naturally to 
vicarious liability. In the words of one district court:  
The theory of vicarious liability developed from the law of agency, specifically 
employer-employee relationships, in which the “master” was held strictly liable 
for the torts of a “servant.” Various legal concepts were fashioned to explain this 
liability, including the concepts of “control,” “right to control,” and “manner and 
means of performance.”162  
As further explained by the U.S. Supreme Court in the leading case of Sony Corp. of Am. v. 
Universal City Studios, Inc.163: 
 The absence of . . . express language in the copyright statute does not 
preclude the imposition of liability for copyright infringement on certain parties 
who have not themselves engaged in the infringing activity. For vicarious liability 
is imposed in virtually all areas of the law, and the concept of contributory 
infringement is merely a species of the broader problem of identifying the 
circumstances in which it is just to hold one individual accountable for the 
actions of another.164 
160 Sony Corp. of Am., 464 U.S. at 435.  Contributory copyright infringement, like contributory patent infringement, 
see note 42 supra, has little relevance in the officer liability field, and so is not discussed further in this paper.  
161 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 155, § 12.04[A]. 
162 Polygram Int’l Publ’g, Inc. v. Nevada/TIG, Inc., 855 F. Supp. 1314, 1325 (D. Mass. 1994) (citing RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(2) (1958)). 
163 464 U.S. 417 (1984). 
164 464 U.S. 417, 435 (1984). 
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 However, the courts do not just turn to traditional common law doctrine in fleshing out 
copyright indirect infringement liability; they also turn to statutory patent law. As a result, the 
relationship between indirect infringement under the Patent Act and in copyright law is oddly 
incestuous. For example, the Sony Court noted the lack of “precedent in the law of copyright 
for the imposition of vicarious liability” on the particular theory asserted by the plaintiff, and 
then drew upon “[t]he closest analogy”—patent law—noting that it was “appropriate to refer 
[to patent liability rules] because of the historic kinship between patent law and copyright 
law.”165 Ultimately, the Sony Court turned to contributory patent infringement law in 
articulating a standard for copyright contributory infringement.166 Two decades later, in MGM 
Studios v. Grokster,167 the Supreme Court acknowledged the Sony Court’s borrowing of 
contributory infringement from the Patent Act for copyright law, and used it as grounds for 
turning to the inducement language from Section 271(b) of the Patent Act in analyzing the 
meaning of intent for inducement of infringement in the copyright area.168 The Grokster 
copyright intent language was then relied upon by the Federal Circuit in analyzing intent for 
inducement of infringement under the Patent Act,169 completing a circle from the Patent Act to 
copyright common law to judicial interpretation of the Patent Act.  
 Thus, indirect copyright infringement law is an unusual amalgamation of common law 
tort doctrine and statutory patent law concepts, developed and created through the courts on 
a case-by-case basis. As characterized by Grossman, the end result is an “equitable, common 
law mush produced by courts trying to do justice in individual cases, often relying upon no 
more than analogies to other areas of the law.”170 In particular, “the primordial cases for . .  . 
vicarious liability evidence no grand principle in the making, nor even a distinct doctrine.”171 
165 Id. at 439. The plaintiff argued that the defendant should be held liable because “it has sold equipment with 
constructive knowledge of the fact that its customers may use that equipment to make unauthorized copies of 
copyrighted materials.” Id.  
166 Id. 
167 545 U.S. 913 (2005). 
168 Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2780 (“For the same reasons that Sony took the staple-article doctrine of patent law as a 
model for its copyright safe-harbor rule, the inducement rule, too, is a sensible one for copyright. We adopt it here 
. . . .”). 
169 See MEMC Electronic Materials, Inc. v. Mitsubishi Materials Silicon Corp., 420 F.3d 1369, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2005) 
(citing Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2768); Golden Blount, Inc. v. Robert H. Peterson Co., 438 F.3d 1354, 1365 n.4 (Fed. 
Circ. 2006) (citing MEMC and Grokster). 
170 Craig A. Grossman, The Evolutionary Drift of Vicarious Liability and Contributory Infringement: From Interstitial 
Gap Filler to Arbiter of the Content Wars, 58 SMU L. REV. 357, 363 (2005). 
171 Id. at 361.  
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Grossman summarized the early development of vicarious liability for copyright infringement, 
concluding that:  
The early cases show courts trying to distinguish based almost exclusively on 
policy between business arrangements to which no copyright liability should 
attach and those to which it should.  Absentee landlords provide the paradigm of 
innocence, while proprietors of entertainment and hospitality establishments 
are found liable for the infringing performance of their employees and 
independent contractor orchestras.172 
The modern articulation of vicarious liability as an explicit theory for indirect copyright 
infringement liability stems from the leading case of Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green 
Co.,173 decided by the Second Circuit in 1963.174 Faced with an allegation that a store that 
allowed a concessionaire to sell infringing copies of musical recordings on its premises should 
itself be held liable for infringement, the court noted that it was faced with a “legal problem 
vexing in its difficulty, a dearth o[f] squarely applicable precedents, a business setting so 
common that the dearth of precedents seems inexplicable, and an almost complete absence of 
guidance from the terms of the Copyright Act”175 (a characterization that seems apt for the 
officer liability area as well). 
 In examining how far liability for copyright infringement should extend, the H.L. Green 
Co. court noted that its inquiry was one of having “to trace, case by case, a pattern of business 
relationships which would render one person liable for the infringing conduct of another.”176 
Thus, traditional respondeat superior doctrine would apply to hold a master liable for copyright 
infringement by a servant within the normal scope of his or her employment.177 However, the 
court saw no reason to cling to formal employer-employee relationship distinctions as opposed 
to considering broader relationships arising out of independent contract, license, and lease.178 
Ultimately, the court concluded: 
172 Id. 
173 316 F.2d 304 (1963). 
174 See Fonavisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 261-62 (9th Cir. 1996) (the “concept of vicarious copyright 
liability was developed in the Second Circuit as an outgrowth of the agency principles of respondeat superior”). 
175316 F.2d  at 305. 
176 Id. at 307. 
177 Id. (citing M. Witmark & Sons v. Calloway, 22 F.2d 412, 414 (E.D. Tenn. 1927). 
178 Id. (citation omitted). 
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When the right and ability to supervise coalesce with an obvious and direct 
financial interest in the exploitation of copyrighted materials—even in the 
absence of actual knowledge that the copyright monopoly is being impaired—
the purposes of copyright law may be best effectuated by the imposition of 
liability upon the beneficiary of that exploitation.179 
 The H.L. Green Co. court was looking at vicarious liability in the context of trying to 
determine when to hold one defendant liable for the acts of another actor with which it had a 
business relationship. It was not contemplating the question of when liability should attach to 
an individual whose connection to the copyright infringement is based in his or her role as an 
officer.  
The courts have since condensed the H.L. Green Co. court’s statement into a concise, 
two-prong test for vicarious copyright liability, finding that vicarious liability attaches when the 
defendant has: (1) the right and ability to supervise the infringing conduct, and (2) “an obvious 
and direct financial interest” in the infringing activity.180 Although a straightforward test is 
appealing to courts because of its simplicity, the distillation of the infringement into the 
relationship between the potential defendants as a simplistic test makes it too easy to impose 
liability upon an individual officer, as the next Section illustrates. 
  B. Officer Liability for Copyright Infringement 
 Individual officer liability for copyright infringement can arise in one of two ways. The 
first is actual participation in direct infringement, which arises from the statutory language of 
the Copyright Act.181 The second, vicarious liability, arises from the case law, drawing upon 
officer liability in patent law; like patent law, it shows a disturbing deviation from traditional 
legal doctrine, although the deviation takes a different path. 
   1. Direct Copyright Infringement 
179 Id. (citations omitted). 
180 See Roy Export Co. Establishment v. Trs. of Columbia Univ., 344 F. Supp. 1350, 1352 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (both 
prongs of test must be satisfied for vicarious liability to arise). Courts generally agree that vicarious liability may be 
applied in the copyright arena even in the absence of an employee-employer relationship. See Gershwin Publ’g 
Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971). 
181 See supra Part III.A. 1 (direct copyright infringement). 
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 In theoretical terms, an officer can be held directly liable for copyright infringement 
based upon his own culpable actions—a principle that arises out of traditional tort liability 
notions.182 As noted by one early court: 
Since infringement constitutes a tort, common law notions of tort liability are 
relevant in fixing the scope of the statutory copyright remedy, and the basic 
common law doctrine that one who knowingly participates in or furthers a 
tortious act is jointly and severally liable with the prime tort-feasor is applicable 
in suits arising under the Copyright Act.183 
 In practice, only a few courts have used personal participation by a corporate officer to 
support imposition of direct copyright infringement liability upon the individual, and they 
seldom probe deeply into the analysis. In 2013, in Disney Enterprises, Inc. v. Hotfile Corp.,184 for 
example, the district court noted that individuals can be held directly liable for their own 
actions under traditional doctrine: "‘a corporate officer who directs, controls, ratifies, 
participates in, or is the moving force behind the infringing activity, is personally liable for such 
infringement.’"185 However, this language was little more than expository, as the court went on 
to house the individual liability of the officer at issue in vicarious liability, without further 
discussion of direct infringement liability.186 
 Bangkok Broadcasting & T.V. Co. v. IPTV Corp.,187 decided in 2010, is a rare example of 
an officer being held personally liable for direct copyright infringement. The district court 
applied traditional tort doctrine in assessing officer liability, noting: “Under Ninth Circuit 
precedent, ‘a corporate officer or director is, in general, personally liable for all torts which he 
authorizes or directs or in which he participates, notwithstanding that he acted as an agent of 
the corporation and not on his own behalf.’"188  This “basic principle,” the court noted, applies 
across a number of fields, including trademark law, unfair competition, unfair business 
182 See supra Part I.A.2. 
183 Screen Gems-Columbia Music, Inc. v. Mark-Fi Records, Inc., 256 F. Supp. 399, 403 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). 
184 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 172339 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 20, 2013). 
185 Id. at *134 (quoting Babbit Elecs. Inc., v. Dynascan Corp., 38 F.3d 1161, 1184 (11th Cir. 1994); Southern Bell Tel. 
& Tel. Co. v. Assoc. Tel. Directory Publishers, 756 F.2d 801, 811 (11th Cir. 1985)).   
186 See id. 
187 742 F. Supp. 2d 1101 (C.D. Cal. 2010).   
188 Id. at 1114 (citations omitted). 
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practices, and, notably, copyright infringement.189 The court further explained that cases 
imposing individual liability upon corporate officers typically have “’involved instances where 
the defendant was the “guiding spirit” behind the wrongful conduct, . . . or the “central figure” 
in the challenged corporate activity.’”190  
 After determining that the corporation was liable for copyright infringement, the 
Bangkok Broadcasting court evaluated the individual liability of Ron Petcha, the CEO. In 
establishing that Petcha had control over or was the ‘guiding spirit’ behind the infringing 
activity the court pointed out that he: (1) had been the CEO since the corporation’s founding; 
(2) personally hired all employees, selected programming, and arranged distribution 
agreements; and (3) personally negotiated the license renewal agreement at issue in the 
case.191 Thus, Petcha was held jointly liable with the corporation for the copyright 
infringement.192 
 The outcome in Bangkok Broadcasting is disturbing, for the acts of the officer that led to 
imposition of personal liability are the type of acts commonly undertaken by managers. Read 
on its face, the case seems to stand for a broad imposition of officer liability, and would seem 
to be a troubling extension of personal liability to all officers engaged in normal officer activities 
– hiring, negotiating, and managing the firm. However, the court’s opinion also notes that the 
defendants had failed to counter the plaintiff’s assertion of individual liability,193 so perhaps a 
direct opposition would have changed the outcome. 
 The courts’ reluctance to hold a corporate officer liable for personal participation in the 
copyright infringement undoubtedly stems from the strict liability standard of direct copyright 
infringement. The implications of strict liability for corporate officers in the copyright area are 
much the same as in the patent area: the corporate officer, theoretically at least, can be held 
individually liable and without fault or intent for personal participation in the infringing 
behavior. This result is harsh,194 and so courts in the copyright area, as in the patent area,195 
189 Id.  
190 Id. 
191 Id. at 1115. 
192 The court did not engage in any discussion of the ownership interest, if any, that he might have held, or of any 
financial benefit that Petcha might have derived from the infringement—topics that courts imposing vicarious 
liability often turn to. See infra Part III.A.2. 
193 742 F. Supp. 2d at 1115. 
194 As Part IV , infra, explains, while the goals of strict liability such as risk-spreading or economic efficiency make 
sense in the context of the firm, they are not effective as applied to the individual. 
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have turned to other mechanisms for assessing officer liability. While in patent law those 
alternative mechanisms are incorrect applications of piercing theory, in copyright law the 
mechanisms take the form of locating officer liability in vicarious liability and in then 
articulating an expansive multi-factor test for evaluating such liability that is at odds with 
traditional agency, tort, and corporate doctrines. 
 Under the traditional, two-pronged test for vicarious liability, imposition of vicarious 
liability upon the individual officer arises from the belief that the individual is able to police the 
conduct of the corporate infringer;196 that control, when coupled with a financial interest 
(usually in the form of an ownership stake), leads to individual liability.197 In Arista Records LLC 
v. Lime Group LLC,198 for example, the facts indicated that Mark Gorton was: (1) the sole 
Director of Lime Works, which was liable for copyright infringement, and (2) the CEO, 100% 
shareholder, and sole director of Lime Group. Lime Group was the controlling shareholder of 
Lime Works, owning 87% of the company. The court identified a number of factors that led to 
its finding that Gorton had the ability to supervise the infringing activity including: (1) Gorton’s 
own testimony that he “ran” Lime Works; (2) testimony of the former COO that Gorton was 
“ultimate decision-maker”; (3) testimony by the former COO that Gorton’s approval was 
required for “any major strategic or design decisions”; (4) testimony by a Lime Works employee 
that Gorton could “veto” development decisions; and (5) Gorton’s heavy involvement in 
creating the program that was the core of the infringing activities and his knowledge of the 
infringing activities.199 The court established that Gorton had a financial interest in the activity 
because as majority owner of Lime Works, Lime Group and Gorton by virtue of his 100% 
ownership of Lime Group, directly benefited from the infringing activity.   
  2. Vicarious Copyright Infringement Liability 
 In the context of copyright infringement doctrine, personal participation has become 
wrapped into the vicarious liability standard, shifting personal participation from direct 
195 See supra Part II.B and accompanying text. 
196 See Boz Scaggs Music v. KND Corp., 491 F. Supp. 908, 913 (D. Conn. 1980). 
197 Some courts state this more directly, using the traditional vicarious liability test generally employed in copyright 
law. See, e.g., Hamstein Music Co. v. Club Sahara, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20644 (D.N.H. Oct. 26, 1993) (“a corporate 
officer may be vicariously liable if he or she has the right to or ability to supervise the infringing activity and also 
has a direct financial interest in such activity”) (citing Sailor Music v. Mai Kai of Concord, Inc., 640 F. Supp. 629, 633 
(D.N.H. 1986)). 
198 715 F. Supp. 2d 481 (S.D.N.Y.  2010). 
199 Id. at 521-22. 
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infringement liability to a form of indirect liability.200 Adding to the confusion, a number of 
courts have classified personal participation as a form of contributory infringement as well,201 
reflecting the blurred lines of copyright infringement liability.202 
In 1976, the U.S. district court for Massachusetts, in Famous Music Corp. v. Bay State 
Harness Horse Racing & Breeding Association, Inc.,203 devised a multi-factor test for vicarious 
liability for individual officers for copyright infringement that is considerably more specific than 
the general two-prong test derived from H.L. Green Co.204 This test  has a laundry list of factors 
that may be considered in evaluating officer individual liability: 
(1) the officer personally participated in the actual infringement; or (2) the 
officer derived financial benefit from the infringing activities as either a major 
shareholder in the corporation, or through some other means such as receiving a 
percentage of the revenues from the activity giving rise to the infringement; or 
(3) the officer used the corporation as an instrument to carry out a deliberate 
infringement of copyright; or (4) the officer was the dominant influence in the 
corporation, and determined the policies which resulted in the infringement; or 
(5) on the basis of some combination of the above criteria.205 
The Famous Music test is based largely on the belief that a corporate officer is able to police the 
actions of the direct infringer (the corporation).  
 Interestingly, the Famous Music plaintiff was asserting that an officer should be held 
liable as a joint tortfeasor with the corporation for copyright infringement. Arguably, then, the 
200 See infra Part III.A.2. (The current vicarious liability standard, in fact, specifically refers to the officer’s “personal 
participat[ion] in the actual infringement. See infra note 208 and accompanying text. 
201 Microsoft Corp. v. Ram Distribution, 625 F. Supp. 2d 674, 682 (E.D. Wis. 2008) (citations omitted) (A party may 
be contributorily liable if he directly participates in the infringing activity or induces, causes, or materially 
contributes to the infringing conduct of another.”). See also Nelson-Salabes, Inc. v. Morningside Dev. LLC, 284 F.3d 
505, 513 (4th Cir. 2002); A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1022 (9th Cir. 2001); Pinkham v. Sara 
Lee Corp., 983 F.2d 824 , 834 (8th Cir. 1992); Southern Bell Te. & Tel. Co. v. Assoc. Tel. Directory Publishers, 756 
F.2d 801, 811 (11th Cir. 1985); Gershwin Pub. Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1163 (2d Cir. 
1971).  
202 See supra Part III.A.2. 
203 423 F. Supp. 341 (D. Mass. 1976). 
204 See supra note 182 and accompanying text. 
205 Id.  at 654-55 (quoting Famous Music Corp v. Bay State Harness Racing & Breeding Assoc., Inc., 423 F. Supp. 341, 
344 (D. Mass. 1976) (internal citations omitted), aff’d, 554 F.2d 1213 (1st Cir. 1977)). See also  NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, 
supra note 152, § 12.04[A][q] (footnotes omitted). 
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Famous Music test applies to direct copyright infringement—and certainly, some of the factors 
listed in the test, such as personal participation, are more logical in that context. Subsequent 
cases, however, have employed the test as a means for evaluating the vicarious liability of 
corporate officers, thus shifting the test to the indirect copyright infringement realm (and 
further illustrating the doctrinal and theoretical confusion of this arena).206 
On close examination, the Famous Music test is nonsensical. The factors are stated in 
the alternative—“or”—such that any one factor theoretically suffices to impose liability upon 
an individual actor. The implications of this are interesting. The first factor—personal 
participation—replicates the test for direct infringement liability, yet, as noted above,207 courts 
have adopted this test in the context of indirect infringement. The second factor—financial 
benefit as a major shareholder—creates the potential for holding an officer liable merely 
because he holds dual roles as an officer and an owner—a result wholly in conflict with 
traditional corporate doctrine.208 The third factor looks like a variant of the alter ego test,209 
while the fourth factor looks much like a “control” test. The second and fourth factors, 
combined together, closely mimic the traditional two-prong test for vicarious liability.  
In practice, the individuals against whom infringement liability is sought under the 
Famous Music test tend to hold multiple roles within the corporation. Marvin Music Co. v. BHC 
Lim Partnership210 is a good illustration of how an individual’s multiple roles within a 
corporation can intertwine and complicate the liability analysis.  BHC Corp. was the general 
partner of BHC Limited Partnership, which in turn owned, controlled, and operated Club Café 
(at which copyrighted music was performed and played without authorization).211 Frank 
Ribaudo held multiple roles; he was the president of the corporation, a general partner of the 
limited partnership, and general manager of Club Café.212 
206 See, e.g., Dream Custom Homes, Inc. v. Modern Day Constr., Inc., 773 F. Supp. 2d 1288 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 22, 2011); 
Emi Mills Music, Inc. v. Empress Hotel, Inc., 470 F. Supp. 2d 67 (D. P.R. 2006); Marvin Music Co. v. BHC Lim 
Partnership, 830 F. Supp. 651 (D. Mass. 1993). 
 
207 See supra note 209 and accompanying text. 
208 See supra notes Part II.A.2 and accompanying text. 
209 See id. 
210 830 F. Supp. 2d 651 (D. Mass. 1993). 
211 Id. at 653. 
212 Id.  
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In analyzing Ribaudo’s vicarious liability as an individual, the court adopted the Famous 
Music test,213 but also emphasized that Ribaudo was, “at all relevant times, . . . an officer, 
shareholder and partner in the organizations controlling the Club Café”214 (thus emphasizing  
the individual’s multiple roles). The court list a number of activities—controlling of day-to-day 
operations, hiring of musicians, direct engagement in licensing activities with ASCAP, 
knowledge of the license termination, and dominant influence over club policies215—but did 
not discuss whether those activities would suggest personal participation in the wrongful acts.  
However, the Marvin Music court noted, the Famous Music test addresses the scenario 
where an officer “derived financial benefit from the infringing activities as either a major 
shareholder in the corporation, or through some other means . . . .”216 This factor does not rely 
upon a piercing of the corporate veil, as does traditional corporate law doctrine for imputing 
liability to shareholders.217 Rather, the inquiry focuses merely on the financial benefit derived 
by the individual from the infringing activity, regardless of the individual’s role. In this instance, 
the court found, the Famous Music test was satisfied because Ribaudo’s “multiple roles in the 
club’s management and ownership” provided him with “a substantial financial stake in the 
infringing activity, which undoubtedly attracted patrons to the Club Café.”218 Thus, the Famous 
Music test collapses Ribaudo’s separate roles as a shareholder and an officer into a single 
analysis that significantly broadens individual exposure to copyright infringement and 
significantly weakens the protections of the corporate form for small and closely-held 
corporations in particular. 
By contrast, the district court in Emi Mills Music, Inc. v. Empress Hotel, Inc.,219 found a 
corporate officer vicariously liable under the Famous Music test without discussion of the 
source of the individual’s financial benefit. The officer at issue, Carl Palermo, was identified as 
the president and treasurer of a corporation accused of unauthorized public performance of 
copyrighted music, as such, the court found, had “responsibility for the control, management 
operations and maintenance of the corporation’s affairs.220 However, he was not identified by 
213 See supra note 189 and accompanying text. 
214 830 F. Supp. at 655. 
215 Id. 
216 Id. at 654-55.  
217 See supra Part I.A.1. 
218 830 F. Supp. at 655. 
219 470 F. Supp. 2d 67 (D. P.R. 2006).  
220 Id. at 74. 
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the court as having any ownership interest in the corporation. Nonetheless, the court found 
him to be jointly and severally liable with the corporation for copyright infringement,221 citing 
two factors of the Famous Music test: (1) the individual’s substantial financial stake in the 
infringing activity; and (2) the individual’s dominant influence in the corporation and control 
over policies that led to infringement.222 While under Famous Music, either element alone can 
suffice to support individual officer liability, it is unclear what financial benefit the EMI Mills 
Music court was looking to, other than mere employment by the hotel. To the extent that mere 
employment satisfies the second factor of the Famous Music test, all corporate officers are at 
risk of being held indirectly liable for copyright infringement. 
 Similarly, Anton Titov, the individual at issue in Disney Enterprises, Inc. v. Hotfile Corp., 
was primarily a technical engineer, “responsible for implementing business ideas and 
functions,” for the allegedly infringing corporation.223 He actively participated in the 
corporation’s management and decisionmaking,224 although it was “undisputed” that he lacked 
“authority to make unilateral decisions regarding important aspects of [the corporation’s] 
business or operations.”225 Titov held a power of attorney from the corporation to act as 
manager of the company “when authorized to do so by other shareholders,”226 and wrote the 
source code that ran the corporation’s website and that was the basis for the allegations of 
infringement against the corporation.227  
 The court acknowledged Titov’s role as a shareholder of the firm without discussing the 
relevance of such status.228 Rather, the court’s analysis focused on Titov’s actions that showed 
his “participation, control, and benefit” in the corporation’s activities.229 The court found that 
Titov had both a “dominant influence upon the corporation”230 and derived a financial benefit 
221 Id. 
222 Id.  
223  2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 172339, at *42 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 20, 2013). 
224 Id. at *43. 
225 Id. at *44. 
226 Id.  
227 Id. at *43-44. 
228 Id. at *141 (“He owners a stake in the company nearly as large as its other . . . shareholders and runs it in equal 
part . . . .). 
229 Id.  
230 Id. at *144.  
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from the infringing activities, although it is unclear whether Titov derived those benefits in his 
role as a shareholder rather than as an officer.231 If the financial benefit was accrued by Titov 
solely in his role as a shareholder, that suggests that any active officer who holds an ownership 
stake in the corporation is at risk of personal liability—a substantial and unwarranted expansion 
of individual liability. 
  3. Hints of Piercing Analysis in Copyright Cases 
 Noticeably absent from either the traditional two-pronged vicarious liability test or the 
Famous Music test is any reference to a piercing of the corporate veil. Thus, when the plaintiff 
in White v. Marshall232 argued that an individual should be held personally liable for the 
corporation’s alleged infringing activities based upon “the role he played—as an owner and 
manager in the corporation,”233 the court rejected the argument. As the court explained: 
 To ‘pierce the corporate veil’ is to hold the owners of a corporation to be 
personally liable for the corporation’s liabilities. This is only done when ‘the 
corporation’s “affairs are organized, controlled, and conducted so that the 
corporation has no separate existence of its own and is the mere instrumentality 
of the shareholders and the corporate form is used to evade an obligation, gain 
an unjust advantage or to commit an injustice.”’234 
 However, piercing notions seem to be creeping into a few copyright officer liability 
cases. In 2010, in Word Music LLC v. Lynns Corp. of Am.,235 for example, the court recited the 
Famous Music multi-factor test for officer vicarious liability.236 The officer, however, argued 
that he could only be liable under a piercing analysis, citing Orthokinetics.237 The court 
acknowledged that Orthokinetics was a patent infringement case, but then went on to apply it, 
noting that Orthokinetics recognized personal participation in a tort as grounds for liability, as 
231 Id. at *143 (“the evidence shows that as the company earned money from new subscriptions (some portion of 
which was attributable to the availability of infringing materials), so did Titov”).  
232 693 F. Supp. 2d 873 (E.D. Wis. 2009). 
233 Id. at 885. Status as the sole shareholder and manager alone has been held insufficient to render an individual 
liable for copyright infringement. See Bourne Co. v. Khalil, 611 F. Supp. 269, 271 (E.D. Mich. 1985). 
234 693 F. Supp. 2d at 885 (citations omitted). 
235 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95559 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 13, 2010). 
236 Id. at *20. 
237 Id. at *21. 
40 
 
                                                          
Oswald --Officer Liability 
Draft--25 May 2014 
Please do not quote or cite without permission 
 
 
 
well as piercing.238 The Word Music court then noted that the Orthokinetics court imposed 
liability on an individual who was the president and sole shareholder and was “directly 
responsible for the design and production of the infringing” products and “who stood to benefit 
from the sales” of said products.239 By comparison, the officer in Word Music was the “sole 
officer, director and shareholder” of the defendant corporation, was the “ultimate authority” 
for decision-making at the corporation with regard to advertising, distribution and sales, 
“personally participated” in the decision to sell infringing products, “personally benefitted 
financially” from the sales of infringing products, and was “the dominant influence in the 
corporation and determined the policies that resulted in infringement.” This, the court found, 
was sufficient to support direct infringement liability in the officer. 
 C. Summary 
Imposition of individual liability upon corporate officers for copyright infringement is at 
doctrinal odds with traditional corporate, agency, and tort law doctrine. It is not, perhaps, as 
spectacularly wrong as the piercing analysis used by the Federal Circuit in the patent 
infringement arena, but it still cannot be reconciled with traditional doctrine.  The inconsistency 
in analysis is clear even from the terminology used in this area. The courts analyze officer 
liability as a form of vicarious liability, yet vicarious liability is really a form of agency law that 
holds the master strictly liable for the torts of the servant. In the context of officer liability for 
copyright infringement, though, we are not dealing with a liability imputed to the corporation, 
but the individual liability of the officer based on his or her own conduct. It is really a direct—
i.e., strict—liability that we are addressing. 
Something must be driving the appellate courts—both the regional circuits in the 
instance of copyright law and the Federal Circuit in the instance of patent law—down the 
wrong path.  As the next Part argues, that “something” is mostly likely the courts’ discomfort 
with the imposition of strict liability and their machinations to avoid imposing such a harsh 
liability standard upon corporate officers.  
IV. OFFICER LIABILITY IN A STRICT LIABILITY REGIME 
 We have seen that the courts confuse the bases for liability of officers with those of 
shareholders and try to force the personal liability of officers into vicarious liability categories 
when traditional doctrine would find the officers liable only for their direct participation in 
238 Id. at *22.  
239 Id. (quoting Orthokinetics, 806 F.2d at 1579).  
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tortious acts. Courts and commentators often are not precise in applying traditional concepts of 
corporate, agency, and tort law. Such imprecision may be exacerbated by the narrow scope of 
the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction and its lack of opportunity to apply these concepts over a 
broad range of cases. 
Nevertheless, the explanation for the incorrect theories of officer liability that we have 
seen applied likely lies in the courts’ profound discomfort with strict liability and its application 
to corporate officers and directors. Direct infringement under both patent law and copyright 
law is based on strict liability, although, as mentioned above,240 that strict liability is less “strict” 
in the copyright area because the ameliorating influence of the fair use defense provides an 
“out” in copyright law that is lacking in patent law. Holding corporate officers strictly liable for 
infringement appears fundamentally unfair and inconsistent not only with traditional 
corporate, agency, and tort law, but the underlying purposes of strict liability regimes. 
 A. The Strict Liability Standard 
 Strict liability is generally defined as “liability that is imposed on an actor apart from 
either (1) an intent to interfere with a legally protected interest without a legal justification for 
doing so, or (2) a breach of a duty to exercise reasonable care, i.e., actionable negligence.”241 
Modern common law generally applies strict liability for specific types of actions, such as 
hazardous activities242 or the manufacture and sale of products, that cause harm to others. 
Fundamentally, the question comes down to which party is better able to allocate the costs, 
insure against the risks, and reduce or warn against the inherent dangers of the activity at 
issue?243 
Imposition of strict liability is guided by several policies and objectives, such as the 
promotion of fairness, economic efficiency, risk-spreading, and deterrence.244 Although a full 
240 See Part III supra. 
241 W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 75, at 534 (5th ed. 1984). 
242 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519 (1) (1977) (“One who carries on an abnormally dangerous activity is 
subject to liability for harm to the person, land or chattels of another resulting from the activity, although he has 
exercised the utmost care to prevent the harm.”).  
243 See Lynda J. Oswald, Strict Liability of Individuals Under CERCLA: A Normative Analysis, 20 B.C. ENVT’AL AFF. L. REV. 
579, 593-98 (1993). 
244 See Greenman v. Yuba Power Prod., Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 
A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960); Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 525 P.2d 1033, 1026 n.6 (Or. 1974).  
 Strict liability has been explored by many commentators in many settings. See, e.g., GUIDO CALABRESI, THE 
COSTS OF ACCIDENTS (1970); Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: 
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exploration of these policies is beyond the scope of this manuscript, the basic principles 
underlying them can be summed up easily.  
Fairness, in this setting, rests on the notion that where both parties are blameless, the 
one who created the risk of harm and enjoyed the benefit of the activity should bear any 
ensuing loss.245 As explained by Epstein: 
[I]f the gains derived from certain activities are indeed as great as the 
defendant contends, there is all the more reason why he should pay for the 
harm those activities caused to the person or property of another, for, as against 
an innocent plaintiff who has nothing to do with the creation of the harm in 
question, it is only too clear that the defendant who captures the entire benefit 
of his own activities should, to the extent that the law can make it so, also bear 
its entire costs.246 
The economic efficiency arguments espoused in the strict liability context rest on the 
notion that maximization of societal welfare and an efficient free market demand that firms 
and consumers bear the true costs associated with the activities that they undertake; i.e., costs 
should be “internalized.”247 Forcing a firm to bear all of the costs associated with its activities 
ensures that the price charged consumers will be a true price (e.g., costs will not be shunted off 
onto non-compensated injured parties), thus eliminating market distortions and 
inefficiencies.248 
Strict liability can also assist in the spreading of risk. A firm forced to bear the costs of 
injuries occasioned by its activities can spread those risks among all consumers by raising prices 
enough to cover the liability. Each consumer can bear a small increase in price more easily than 
One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972); David G. Owen, Rethinking the Policies of Strict Products 
Liability, 33 VAND. L. REV. 681 (1980);  Richard A. Posner, Strict Liability: A Comment, 2 J. LEG. STUD. 205 (1973); 
Steven Shavell, Strict Liability v. Negligence, 9 J. LEG. STUD. 1 (1980). 
245 This notion can be derived from the seminal case of This notion can be derived from the seminal case of Rylands 
v. Fletcher, 3 H. & C. 744, 159 Eng. Rep. 737, rev’d, L.R. 1 (Ex. 265), aff’d, L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868) (English & Irish 
Appeals), where the court stated: “the neighbor, who has brought something on his own property which was not 
naturally there, harmless to others so long as it is confined to his own property, but which he knows to be 
mischievous if it gets on his neighbor’s, should be obliged to make good the damage which ensues . . . .”). 
246 RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, MODERN PRODUCTS LIABILITY Law 27 (1980). 
247 See Barbara Ann White, Economizing on the Sins of our Past: Cleaning up Our Hazardous Wastes, 25 HOUS. L. 
REV. 899, 915-17 (1988).  
248 Id. at 917. 
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an injured party can bear the full costs of an uncompensated harm.249 To the extent that the 
risk can be covered by insurance, it is generally easier (and thus more economically efficient) 
for the firm to obtain that insurance than the individual at risk of harm.250 
Finally, strict liability is thought to promote deterrence. The party undertaking the 
activity that causes harm is in the best position to identify the accompanying risks and to take 
measures to minimize or eradicate that harm.251 Thus, imposition of strict liability encourages 
these parties to structure their activities in such a way as to reduce the potential harm 
associated with their undertakings.252 At a more pragmatic level, strict liability avoids the 
burdens of proof associated with a fault-based standard such as negligence.253 
  B. Considering Strict Liability for Officers 
 If we look at the arguments for strict liability, which of these is applicable to the 
imposition of liability on corporate officers?  
Fairness dictates that where both parties are blameless, the party that created the harm 
and benefited from the activity should bear the risk.  The benefit of the activity most directly 
accrues to the firm, not the corporate officer.  Except for indirect benefits such as keeping his or 
her job or perhaps receiving compensation tied to the profits of the firm, the corporate officer 
does not receive the benefits of the activity that created the harm. 
Economic efficiency requires that the risk of harm be priced into a product so that the 
all costs are internalized.  This is accomplished by imposing liability on the corporation and the 
249 See Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 901 (Cal. 1963) (“The purpose of such liability is to 
insure that the costs of injuries resulting from defective products are borne by the manufacturers that put such 
products on the market rather than by the injured persons who are powerless to protect themselves.”) 
250 See Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L. J. 499, 500-02, 543-44 
(1961). 
251 See Guido Calabresi & Jon T. Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE L. J. 1055,1067-74 
(1972).  
252 See CALABRESI, supra note 250, at 541-43; RICHARD  A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 6.5 (8TH ed. 2011) (“[I]f a 
class of activities can be identified in which activity-level changes by potential injurers appear to be the most 
efficient method of accident prevention, there is a strong argument for imposing strict liability on the people 
engaged in those activities.”). 
253 See Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prod. Corp., 447 A.2d 539, 548 (N.J. 1982) (strict liability eliminates 
“complicated, costly, confusing, and time-consuming” task of proving that the defendant knew or should have 
known of the risk of harm); POSNER, supra note 252, § 6.5 (“The trial of a strict liability case is simpler than the trial 
of a negligence case because there is one less issue, negligence . . . .”). 
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imposition of additional or secondary liability on the corporate officer does not add to 
economic efficiency. 
Imposing liability on an individual corporate officer does not contribute to a sharing of 
risk.  Risk sharing requires spreading the potential cost of harm among a wide class of 
beneficiaries (in this case, consumers and owners), and is accomplished through pricing. 
Finally, liability imposed on corporate officers could promote deterrence, but only if the 
officer has knowledge of the infringement and the ability to prevent it.  Imposing strict liability 
on officers without knowledge or control can have no deterrent effect. 
 C. Considering Strict Liability of Officers for Patent or Copyright Infringement 
 While the courts are willing to enforce the statutory strict liability schemes for 
corporations, they are more hesitant to impose such a harsh liability regime upon individual 
actors, such as officers. So, the courts have tried to devise alternatives that minimize the finding 
of direct infringement in both areas. 
In the patent law field, the courts have turned to concepts relating to piercing of the 
corporate veil to assess officer liability. The problem with this, of course, is that it not only 
rewrites traditional corporate doctrine, but it essentially eliminates the protection of the 
corporate form for small and closely-held firms, where individuals are likely to wear dual hats as 
owners and officers.  
In the copyright arena, the regional circuits have tended to avoid the application of 
direct infringement liability based on personal participation, and have instead turned to the 
indirect liability of vicarious infringement. However, the multi-factor test that they have 
articulated is a strange conglomeration of factors that suggests a desire to look to an officer’s 
intent to infringe, yet is inartfully worded (to say the least). 
The correct result would be to avoid direct infringement liability in almost all cases for 
officer liability in both patent and copyright cases, on the ground that it is virtually impossible 
for an officer, in his or her role as an officer, to personally undertake the acts that result in 
patent or copyright infringement. The corporation is indeed the direct infringer in the vast 
majority of cases. 
That is not to say, however, the officer should avoid liability in every instance. Rather, 
the officer’s liability should be indirect, and should be supported by the appropriate test for 
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such indirect infringement. In the patent arena, that is inducement of infringement, which has 
an explicit “intent” or scienter requirement.  
Similarly, officer liability for copyright infringement should be grounded in intent. The 
current, multi-factor, Famous Music test does a very poor job of teasing out the officer’s intent, 
as it is not only framed in the alternative (as though only a single factor would suffice to 
establish liability), but it also seems to mix in notions of corporate ownership when it considers 
factors such as financial benefits as a major shareholder.  
  “Control” seems to offer the best proxy for evaluating the personal liability of an officer, 
and there are suggestions of the courts using this criterion in both the patent and copyright 
areas. To the extent that a corporate officer knew of the corporation’s infringement or was 
“willfully blind” to it,254 and the officer was in a position to direct and decide whether the 
corporation did in fact infringe, it would seem to fair to hold that officer personally liable. 
Indeed, the Federal Circuit seems to be implicitly seeking fairness by using piercing analysis, 
which is an equitable doctrine, to assess personal liability. 
It would not take a great leap in doctrine to reach this result under the existing 
“inducement of infringement” language in Section 271(b) of the Patent Act.  However, it would 
require a rewriting of the existing Famous Music vicarious liability test in the copyright field. 
Rewriting that test is warranted and easily accomplished. First, the Famous Music test is already 
specific to the corporate officer inquiry and is distinct from the general vicarious liability 
standard set forth in H.L. Green Co.  The regional circuits have already established that officer 
liability requires a more specialized test than the general vicarious liability standard. In addition, 
there is already an established pattern of borrowing between patent and copyright doctrine; it 
seems eminently reasonable for copyright law to borrow from patent law in the officer liability 
area as well, particularly since there is no good reason to have different standards for 
evaluating officer liability in the patent and copyright fields. In short, the courts can reach the 
“fair” result they seem to be seeking in the officer liability field without completely jettisoning 
traditional doctrine. 
 V. CONCLUSION 
The distinction between liability as a shareholder and liability as an officer seems clear 
on its face. However, in both the patent and copyright arenas, principles of officer liability 
deviate from traditional principles of corporate, tort, and agency doctrine in manners that are 
254 Global Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB, S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060, 2068-69 (2011). 
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inappropriate and that ignore the differences in the role of corporate officers and shareholders. 
While the differing statutory frameworks of patent and copyright law have caused officer 
liability in each area to devolve along different paths, in both areas, courts appear to have been 
motivated by a desire to limit inappropriate extension of strict liability to individual officers—
but in both areas, they have gone about that effort in a manner that ignores traditional 
doctrine, and fails to provide corporate officers with appropriate protection from individual 
liability. 
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